Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Schulich Law Scholars
LLM Theses

Theses and Dissertations

2015

The Proportionality Standard and Constitutional Culture: A
Comparative Analysis of Rights Adjudication in Canada and the
French Republic
James Peter Barry

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/llm_theses
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James Peter Barry, The Proportionality Standard and Constitutional Culture: A Comparative Analysis of
Rights Adjudication in Canada and the French Republic (LLM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2015)
[unpublished].

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Schulich Law Scholars. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses by an authorized administrator of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

The Proportionality Standard and Constitutional Culture:
A Comparative Analysis of Rights Adjudication in Canada and the French Republic

by

James Peter Barry

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Law
at
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2015

© Copyright by James Peter Barry, 2015

Table of Contents
Abstract ...............................................................................................................................v
List of Abbreviations Used .............................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... vii
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................1
i)

Introduction ...............................................................................................................1

ii) Methodology .............................................................................................................5
Chapter 2: How Proportionality is Shaped in its Application by Established
Modes of Legal Reasoning...............................................................................................11
i)

Introduction .............................................................................................................11

ii) The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in Canada ...................................................12
iii) The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in France ....................................................21
iv) The Origins of Judicial Review as a Substantive Exercise in Canada ....................29
v) The Origins of Judicial Review as a Deductive Exercise in France .......................34
vi) Approaches to Proportionality in Both Legal Systems are Converging .................40
vii) Conclusion ..............................................................................................................42
Chapter 3: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of Proportionality to
Legislative Limitations on Religious Expression in Canada and the French
Republic ............................................................................................................................44
i)

Introduction .............................................................................................................44

ii) The Textual Basis for a Proportionality Standard in Canada. ................................45
iii) The Textual Bases for a Proportionality Standard in France ..................................48
iv) Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in Canada ..........................51
v) Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in France ...........................57

ii

vi) The Application of the Proportionality Test in Canada ..........................................61
a)

Proper purpose.....................................................................................................61

b) Rational Connection ............................................................................................65
c)

Minimal Impairment ...........................................................................................67

d) Proportionate Effect ............................................................................................69
vii) .The Application of the Proportionality Test in France ..........................................72
a)

Proportionality is Applied Syllogistically ...........................................................72

b) Deductive Inferences are Justified With Reference to Proportionality’s
…....Requirements.......................................................................................................78
viii) Conclusion ............................................................................................................80
Chapter 4: How the Proportionate Effects Test Acts as the Main Vector for the
Expression of Constitutional Culture ............................................................................82
i)

Introduction .............................................................................................................82

ii) The Proportionate Effects Inquiry: General Observations......................................84
iii) Canadian Constitutional Culture Reflects a Common Law Heritage .....................87
iv) At Common Law, Freedom of Religion Developed as a Negative Right ..............93
v) The Legal Rules Developed for the Application of the Proportionate Effects
……Inquiry Reflect a Common Law Constitutional Culture. .......................................95
vi) In Canada, Justifiable Limitations on Rights are to be Determined Empirically ...98
vii) French Constitutional Culture is Based in an Emancipatory Project which …
……Favours Rationalism .............................................................................................100
viii) The Writings of Rousseau Exerted a Formative Influence on French
……Republicanism ......................................................................................................102
ix) Religious Sectarianism Contributed to the Development of Rousseau’s
…....Notion of the “General Will” ...............................................................................104
x) Laïcité Began to be Incorporated as an Official Doctrine of the French
……Republic in the Late-Nineteenth Century ..............................................................109
iii

xi) French Légiscentisme Presumes a Role for Civic Virtue and Laïcité ...................112
xii) In France, Balancing Reflects a Legicentric Legal Culture ..................................113
xiii) Conclusion ............................................................................................................116
Chapter 5: Conclusion ...................................................................................................119
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................124

iv

Abstract

It has been suggested that the migration of proportionality as a standard of
constitutional review is bringing about a degree of convergence in rights norms across
common and civil law jurisdictions. While scholars have noted its potential to shape
rights norms in legal systems into which it is incorporated, few have analysed the ways in
which proportionality is affected by the constitutional culture in which it is received.
This thesis is a comparative analysis of the application of proportionality in
Canada and the French Republic. It sheds light on the extent to which the operation of
that standard is affected by constitutional culture; that is, by interpretive perspectives and
modes of reasoning prevailing in a given jurisdiction. It isolates the ways in which the
standard is modified, both consciously through the efforts of judges to give meaning to its
requirements and unconsciously through the normative presumptions they bring to bear.
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List of Abbreviations Used

BNA Act

British North America Act, 1867

CVLA

Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865

DDHC

Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (Déclaration
des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789)

ECHR

European Court of Human Rights

ECJ

European Court of Justice

PFRLR

In French Law, a range of judicially-developed “fundamental
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic” having
constitutional status (Principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois
de la République)

QPC

In French law, a petition for a priority preliminary ruling on a
question of constitutionality (une question prioritaire
constitutionnel)

SCC

Supreme Court of Canada
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Chapter 1: Introduction
i)

Introduction
This thesis lends critical insight into the use of proportionality as supra-national

tool of rights adjudication by analysing the role of rights normativity in the application of
that legal standard. By rights “normativity” it is meant the extent to which rights are
historically and culturally contingent, rather than merely the result of positive law. This
analysis is intended to counter-balance the claims of scholars who stress proportionality’s
potential as a universal standard for determining permissible limitations on constitutional
rights. It is suggested that such claims are insufficiently reflective about the relation
between proportionality’s three-step structure and the constitutional culture in which it is
applied. The use of proportionality to review statutory restrictions on religious expression
in the public sphere in Canada and the French Republic is analysed to illustrate this point.
Indeed, the application of proportionality as a standard of constitutional review is
widely regarded as a key vector driving global convergence in constitutional rights
norms. As a three-step means-end rational review for the constitutionality of subconstitutional laws (i.e. statute or common law), it involves a “hybrid” exercise of
inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general principles.1 Accordingly,
it has migrated easily across common and civil law jurisdictions. Developed in German
Basic Law, review on a proportionality standard was first adopted by the European Court
of Justice (the “ECJ”) in 1970, followed by the European Court of Human Rights (the
“ECHR") in 1976, and by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) in 1986. Its primacy
in European law lead in turn to its gradual incorporation into the law of most EU member
states.2 It is for this reason that proportionality has been identified as affirming a
convergence of common and civil law into a “globalised jus commune.”3 The principles
1

Eric Engel, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview”
(2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ 1 at 1.
2
For a history of the migration of proportionality see Aharon Barak, Proportionality:
Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012) at 181-210.
3
Engel, supra note 1. Note that the term jus commune is Latin for “common law” and
used by civil law jurists to refer to those aspects of a civil law system’s invariant legal
principles.
1

of that hybridized body of law it is argued, drive substantive national laws toward
uniform global standards.
It is perhaps unsurprising that many scholars ascribe “neutrality” to the
proportionality standard given the ease with which it has been woven into both common
law and civilian fabric. It is widely contended that the test’s three-step structure, which
again requires both inductive reasoning by analogy and deduction from general
principles, can exert the same methodological pressures in both common law and civilian
legal systems. As David M. Beatty has put it, the proportionality principle is not only
“neutral” but possessed of a “capacity for rationalism” sufficient to justify its status as an
“ultimate rule of law.”4 For their part, Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat have argued
migration of proportionality as a constitutional methodology may in fact be more
effective at transmitting substantive legal doctrines than efforts to secure their direct
adoption.5 The implication is that the formal methodology of proportionality can be
incorporated more or less seamlessly into jurisdictions with different juridical structures
and modes of legal reasoning and yield substantively similar results.
Yet in spite of this “standardizing effect,”6 the three-step proportionality test does
yield different results on similar sets of facts when applied by different constitutional
courts, a point implicitly acknowledged in the European Court of Human Rights’ (the
“ECHR”) decision in SAS v France.7 In its judgment of 1 July 2014, a majority of the
court upheld Law no. 2010-1192 of the French Republic as being a “proportional”
infringement of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the “Convention”).8 Enacted on 11 October 2014, the impugned
statute had affected in France and its overseas territories a full ban on the wearing of
clothing designed to conceal the face in public places. The applicant SAS challenged Law

4

David M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at
171.
5
Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddot Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 139-140.
6
Ibid.
7
SAS v France [GC], no. 43835/11, ECHR 2014.
8
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14, 4 November 1950,
ETS 5, online: European Court of Human Rights <http://www.echr.coe.int>
2

no. 2010-1192 as violating her right to freedom of religion under Art. 9(1) of the
Convention, because it prevented her from covering her face with a veil or niqāb in
accordance with her Islamic faith. The applicant’s Art. 9(1) rights were determined to be
adversely affected, but a majority of the ECHR proceeded to find the law to be a
“proportionate” limitation under Art. 9(2) of the Convention.
Article 9(2) holds that the right to freedom of religion “shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.” It
proceeds to define proper legislative purposes in a democratic society as “public safety,
health or morals, [or] protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’9 The French
government submitted that all Art. 9(2) purposes were engaged by Law no. 2010-1192.
The only argument accepted by the majority, however, was that the impugned legislation
was required to reinforce the egalitarian and fraternal civic bonds at the heart of the
French republican pact, and as such, in Art. 9(2) terms, necessary to “protect the rights
and freedoms others.” This formulation served as the objective of Law no. 2010-1192
that grounded the ECHR’s proportionality analysis. It is in the majority’s application of
that three-part test that an acknowledgement of proportionality’s limitations as an
instrument of rights harmonization can be inferred.
Indeed, having found the prohibition imposed by Law no. 2010-1192 to be (1)
rationally connected to the legislative objective and (2) necessary for its realization, the
majority in SAS proceeded to the more evaluative exercise of (3) determining whether the
ban was proportionate in its effects; that is, whether the salutary effects of the ban were
proportionate to its deleterious effects on the Art. 9 right. A majority of the ECHR
concluded that the legislature of the member state was owed a degree of deference in
formulating legislative policy on which “opinions within a democratic society may
reasonably differ.”10 Specifically, while acknowledging that “from a strictly normative
standpoint, France [was] very much in a minority position in Europe,”11 its legislature
was owed “a broad margin of appreciation” to determine the minimum standards

9

Ibid at Art 9(2).
Supra note 7 at para 16.
11
Ibid at para 156.
10

3

necessary for democratic life.12 In so deciding, the ECHR was applying its long-standing
practice of conferring latitude on member states to craft legislation in light of local
factual and normative conditions as determined by the legislature.
By relying on the “margin of appreciation” doctrine with explicit reference to the
practices of other EU jurisdictions, the majority in SAS acknowledged that other courts
might legitimately arrive at different conclusions as to the proportionality of such bans.
The review of Law no. 2010-1192 by the French Constitutional Council in Decision
2010-613 DC of 7 October 2010 provides such an instance of a court reaching a
“minority position” in Europe, normatively speaking. In this thesis, the Constitutional
Council’s decision in Decision 2010-613 DC respecting concealment of the face in public
will be analysed in light of related case law of the Supreme Court of Canada. In doing so,
it seeks to isolate points of divergence in the application of the proportionality test and to
explain them by relating them to constitutional culture. It is suggested that proportionality
has been modified, both consciously and unconsciously, by Canadian and French jurists
to ease its incorporation into their respective legal systems. Accordingly, it is urged that
there are limits to the potential of proportionality as a standard of review to act as a
vector of constitutional norm convergence across legal systems.
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first lays the ground-work for
comparative analysis by reviewing the incorporation of proportionality in Canada and the
French Republic, both of which until recently were systems of legislative supremacy. The
focus is mainly on how that inductive-deductive “hybrid” standard is applied in systems
with different modes of legal reasoning. In the second chapter, the actual application of
proportionality is analysed, with reference mainly to Decision 2010-613 DC and relevant
Canadian case law. It is proposed that the decisive step of the proportionality test from a
comparative standpoint is the final step of “proportionate effect” or “balancing,” because
it allows for the expression of culturally-based value judgements. The last chapter
focuses on the way in which balancing is conducted in each jurisdiction, revealing how
the rules of its application have been judicially-developed to reflect local modes of legal
reasoning and established rights norms.

12

Ibid at para 16.
4

ii)

Methodology
This thesis attempts to initiate a discussion about constitutional culture, and its

methodology has been developed to that end. The term “constitutional culture” is used to
refer to what might be called the “cultural grounding” of a particular constitutional text;
that is, the socially-construed and historically-transmitted “shared meanings” and
interpretive perspectives which guide its operation as a legal instrument in a given
society.13 It presumes, therefore, that constitutional texts are not “fixed orders,” but
instruments for the expression of notions of order that have been arrived at through
historical development. In other words, all constitutional texts are embedded in a culture
which gives to them their authority and substantive content. Cultural notions are
expressed through the text, both consciously by way of judicial efforts to give meaning to
particular provisions, and unconsciously through the modes of legal reasoning and
normative presumptions that are brought to bear in that task.
This thesis uses a contextualist methodology derived from the precepts of legal
historicism to shed light on differences in the application of proportionality related to the
interaction of that standard with the constitutional culture in which it is applied. As it is
used in this project, the term “historicism” does not denote an effort to comprehensively
review particular aspects of Canadian or French legal history. Rather, legal historicism is
best understood as an interpretive tool based on a recognition of the organic embededness
of law in culture. It is suggested that the application of proportionality should not be
analysed merely as matter of positive law, but with a view to the ways in which it
intersects with intellectual and cultural life. Legal historicism presumes the organic and
particular nature of such disciplines to a given jurisdiction. Thus, cultural and intellectual
history may be leveraged as part of a cautious, rigorous, and contextual interpretation of
the law’s operation in that jurisdiction. In this way, differences which are not readily
apparent from the law’s text alone may be better analysed.

13

Hands Vorländer, “What is ‘Constitutional Culture?’” in Silke Hensel et al, eds,
Constitutional Cultures: On the Concept and Representation of Constitutions in the
Atlantic World (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012) at 28.
5

As Frederick C. Beiser has documented, the historicist tendency in law first
emerged in the early nineteenth century in reaction to the alleged “ahistorical” or
“philosophical” character of “natural law” theories. Indeed, modes of thinking associated
with the eighteenth century Enlightenment tended to insist that law should reflect a
conception of human nature as absolute, eternal, and universal. In contrast, historicists
held that human nature, including morality and reason itself, was relative, particular, and
determined by historical context.14 It was inadvisable, on the historicist view, to abstract
what are essentially local and variable cultural constructs and to represent them as
holding for humanity in general. It is for this reason that the Italian intellectual Benedetto
Croce (1866-1952) defined historicism broadly as an “affirmation that life and reality are
history alone,”15 and not the result of absolute or universal “natural” laws.
Given that a range of different and often contradictory meanings have been
ascribed to “historicism,”16 it is urged that the term should be thought of less as a uniform
intellectual tradition and more as an epistemological orientation. As Beiser has suggested,
to “historicize” one’s thinking is merely to recognize that law, like everything in the
human world is made by history.17 For the historicist, the essence or identity of
everything, including law, is entirely the product of the particular historical processes that
brought it into being.18 While it is not possible to attain a comprehensive knowledge of
those processes, it is possible to shed some light on them by identifying parallels and
points of intersection in the historical development of a range of disciplines such as
philosophy, literature, art or other aesthetic disciplines. Those points of commonality
speak to underlying intellectual and cultural currents which exert a formative influence
even if they are difficult to account for empirically. The objective of historicism is to
situate one type of cultural development (i.e. the formulation of legal doctrine) within a

14

Frederick C Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011) at 1-2.
15
Benedetto Croce, History as the Story of Liberty (London: Allen & Unwin, 1941) as
cited in Christopher Thornhill, “Historicism” in the Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998), IV, at 445.
16
For an overview of the different intellectual traditions which have been described as
“historicist,” see Thornhill, ibid at 443-446.
17
Supra note 14 at 2.
18
Ibid.
6

broader context of intellectual development in order to deepen understanding of law as
culture.
It is critical to appreciate, however, that by referring to historical “processes” this
thesis is not invoking forms of historicism which incorporate metaphysical claims about
historical progress or history’s ultimate ends. A range of philosophies that have been
described as “historicist” have suggested that the acquisition of historical knowledge is
necessary in order to uncover general laws of history in a metaphysical sense. For
instance, both Hegel and Marx saw history as a process of “dialectical” development
toward a particular end.19 On a dialectical reading, any historical subject would be
analysed with a view to its situatedness in the progress of history toward its ultimate
ends. Forms of historicism suggest dialectical or other fixed laws or patterns of historical
development, including but not limited to Hegel and Marx, are not relied on in this thesis.
To the contrary, the historicism used here repudiates all metaphysical claims, and rejects
the suggestion that the study of history can have a predictive power.
References to historical “processes” are above all meant to indicate a “holistic”
interpretation of law as organic to cultural history. As a basic precept of early legal
historicism, interpretive “holism” suggests that for all aspects of human anthropology,
including law, the cultural “whole” is prior to its parts and irreducible to them.20 On a
holistic view, then, a given legal rule is not to be regarded merely as a singular,
autonomous element, but one which derives its very meaning from the broader social and
historical context of which it is a part. This is not to say that the “whole” – be it society,
epoch or culture generally – is to be thought of as an aggregate or composite of otherwise
autonomous parts, but rather as a unity determining the essence of its parts.21 In
19

Hegel’s conception of the dialectical development of history is often described as
involving three stages: a thesis gives rise to an antithesis which contradicts the thesis, and
the resolution of the tension between the two yields a synthesis. For Hegel, such
development took place in geist, a concept associated with the workings of the human
mind. The real world merely reflected in an external, phenomenal sense changes in geist.
In contrast, Marx argued that dialectic development took place primarily in the material
world, and that development was reflected in human thought. See Anthony Kenny, The
New History of Western Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 585-586
and 769-773.
20
Supra note 14 at 4-5.
21
Ibid.
7

contemporary terms, this project may be said to embrace a deeply “relational” approach
to interpreting law. A holistic approach assists comparative analysis by relating the
operation of positive law to established norms and entrenched modes of reasoning.
In order to give some form to the cultural “whole” in which law is embedded, the
German jurist Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) used the term “Volksgeist,” or the
“spirit” of a given people. While that term is now considered antiquated given its
methodological obscurity and somewhat mystical associations, its basic methodological
function is served by what are now referred to as “contextualist” approaches to
intellectual and cultural history. As Mathias Riemann has written, the notion of
Volksgeist was essentially a cultural notion,22 and “culture” for Savigny and early legal
historicists was seen not so much as an anthropological term as an intellectual one.23 The
purpose of the Volksgeist concept was to attune legal methodology to the formative
influence of history and the intersectionality of law with other intellectual disciplines,
given their situatedness within a larger context. It is here argued that through assiduous
study of the intellectual history that may reasonably affect the operation of the legal
instrument being studied, (be they linguistic, aesthetic, or otherwise) meaning may
ascribed to given legal rules in way that recognizes their inextricability from culture.
While unempirical, a holistic or contextualist interpretation need not be
excessively broad or ill-focused. Legal historicism has long been concentrated on the
study of “discourses.” By referring to “context,” an historicist in fact signals an effort to
analyse what Jacco Bomhoff defined as “the system of words and concepts within which
[a] relevant community of disputants moved at [a] relevant time.”24 In this thesis,
historical sources are analysed with a view to shedding light on the historical
development of relevant discourses. This requires knowledge of the way in which
particular language is used in conveying certain concepts, for linguistic choices are in
every temporal period leveraged to “perform rhetorical and paradigmatic functions

22

Mathias Reimann, “Nineteenth Century German Legal Science” (1990) 31 BCL Rev 4
at 853.
23
Ibid at 854.
24
Jacco Bomhoff, “Comparing Legal Argument” in Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff,
eds, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012) at 81.
8

related to the conceptualization and conduct of politics.” This thesis assumes that
proportionality as a matter of positive law should be analysed with the understanding that
it is subject to the influence of locally variable legal “grammars,” which can only be
apprehended through familiarity with the intellectual and cultural context of the
jurisdiction in which it is applied.25
This methodology can be contrasted with what has been called an “abstracting” or
“analytic” approach to comparative law. Such approaches attempt to filter out what is
historically and culturally peculiar to a constitutional text in order to facilitate a
comparative analysis of solutions to legal problems.26 While such an approach may be
suited to comparative law with an explicit reform or advocacy objective, it is not
appropriate for a project such as this, which is oriented to developing understanding
rather than reform of the law. It suggested, however, that reform-oriented comparative
scholarship might benefit from an effort to read law on its own terms, as embedded in a
context of particular historical, political and social forces.
Accordingly, doctrinal sources are used in this thesis in an expository, rather than
evaluative or critical manner. For the purposes of this analysis, the word “doctrine” is
used in such a way as to reflect its Latin root “doctrine,” connoting “instruction,
knowledge [and] learning,”27 rather than critical engagement. Again, the analysis is not
reform-oriented but concerned with what may be called “legal science in its narrow and
most basic sense.”28 Thus, prevailing juridical structures and modes of legal reasoning in
each jurisdiction are not only the object of the inquiry, but also as its (principle)
theoretical frame of reference.29 In sum, this thesis adopts a comparative method that
strives for the interpretation of laws individually and in detail, coupled with a thorough25

Ibid at 82.
Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 2-4..
27
Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do:
Doctrinal Legal Research” (2012) 17 Deakin LR 83 at 84.
28
Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) at 6.
29
Pauline Westerman, “Open or Autonomous: The Debate on Legal Methodology as a
Reflection on the Debate on Law” in M v Hoecke, ed, Methodologies of Legal Research:
Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) at
87.
26

9

going effort to analyse the ways in which the operation of law is affected by unarticulated
norms related to what might be called constitutional culture.

10

Chapter 2: How Proportionality is Shaped in its Application by Established Modes
of Legal Reasoning
i)

Introduction
In Canada and the French Republic, the constitutionality of legislative limitations

on freedom of religion is determined by the use of a proportionality test in its standard
triadic formulation. However, application of the test’s substantive requirements procedes
very differently in each jurisdiction. Canadian courts tend to apply proportionality’s
adjudicative machinery in a formal, three-step structure, with each step initiating a
searching and thorough-going inquiry into facts of the case. In contrast, the French
Constitutional Council applies the test by way of a distinctively terse and syllogistic form
of legal reasoning, whereby application of each requirement is often perceptible only in
references to “disproportion manifeste,” “atteintes excessives,” or “mesure approprié.”1
Facially, the difference between Canadian and French modes legal reasoning are stark,
and must be accounted for before a comparative analysis of the legal texts and case law
relevant to this thesis can be undetaken.
The aim of this chapter is to set the stage for analysis of legal dotrine by
explaining why application of proportionality in Canada is so facts-oriented, while in
France it is essentially syllogistic. In doing so, light will be shed on how the use of
proportionality is affecting a degree of convergence in rights adjudication across common
law and civilian jurisdictions. It may be recalled that proportionality is a “hybrid”
exercise, involving inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general
principles.2 The facts of a case are invariably measured against general principles. It will
be argued that the difference between Canadian and French application of the test is a
matter of the extent to which each legal system focuses on facts or principles, both of
which are, again, inherent in the test. That orientation is shaped largely by traditions of
legal reasoning prevailing in each jurisdiction.
1

Daphne Akoumianaki and Georges Katrougalos. “L’application du principe de
proportionalité dans le champ des droits sociaux” (2012) 5 Revue du droit public et de la
science politique en France et à l’étranger 1221 at 15-16.
2
See for example Eric Engel, “The History of the General Principle of Proportionality:
An Overview” (2012) 10 Dartmouth LJ.
11

In this chapter, it will be argued that modes of legal reasoning in Canada and
French Republic are predicated on very different conceptions of the relationship of facts
to legal principles, and that this difference is due to historical divergence in the normative
underpinnings of legislative supremacy. Indeed, before the incorporation of a postiori
judicial review for rights violations in Canada and the French Republic, both jurisdictions
had histories of what may be called legislative supremacy. But as this chapter will argue,
the normative bases of legislative authority in each jurisdiction were (and arguably
remain) different. Those historically-contingent differences account for divergent
conceptions of the judicial function and have powerfully shaped accepted methods of
judicial reasoning. Thus, while proportionality always involves both fact-dependent
induction and principle-based deduction, prevailing common law and civilian norms in
each jurisdiction have heavily influenced its application.
This chapter procedes in five sections. First, the normative bases of legislative
supremacy in Canada are assessed. This involves an inquiry into the historical emergence
of the notion of legislative sovereignty as an institutional concept. The second section
examines the French principle of national sovereignty in historical perspective. The third
and fourth sections of this chapter detail how established practices of judicial review for
jurisdiction issues in each country influenced the incorporation of judicial review for
rights violations on a proportionality standard. Finally, the fifth section reveals an
ongoing convergence in the way in which proportionality is applied in each jurisdiction.
It is concluded that differences in application are deeply-rooted but whatever substantive
differences they yield are decreasing as a result of ongoing convergence.
ii)

The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in Canada
Any account of legislative sovereignty in Canada must concentrate heavily on the

development of parliamentary institutions in Britain. The preamble of the British North
America Act, 1867 (the “BNA Act”), prescribed that Canada is to have a constitution
“similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.”3 Indeed, the Supreme Court of

3

Now the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982)
c. 11, pmbl.
12

Canada has held that the preamble of the BNA Act “gives expression to the nature of the
legislative bodies that were continued or established by it.”4 To discern the normative
bases of legislative sovereignty in Canada, therefore, reference must be made to the
competence “historically ascribed” to the Parliament at Westminster.5 It is critical to note,
however, that the “nature” of such authority is not coterminous with its scope. Canadian
legislatures were long bound by jurisdictional strictures set by the U.K. Parliament. But
within such limits, legislative sovereignty in Canada may be said to be akin to that
enjoyed by Westminster in terms of the normative bases from which it derived its
legitimizing force.
The legislative sovereignty to which federal and provincial legislatures in Canada
may lay claim is a form of what may be called “inherent” sovereignty. That is, it is
generally recognized that the British Parliament is not representative of a sovereign
people, but enjoys sovereignty in its own right, in the sense that its authority to legislate
neither derives from nor depends on popular consent. In other words, Parliament is not a
“trustee” of its electors.6 Rather, the term “parliamentary sovereignty” in the U.K.
connotes institutional independence and the right to make law without being fettered by
external quarters. This jealously-guarded institutional independence was not deduced
from some higher principle of natural law, but emerged slowly and half-consciously
through a process of gradual historical development. The “nature” of the legislative
supremacy, which the BNA Act sought to retain is thus deeply historical, and in the U.K.,
legitimated by appeals to inherited right and precedent.
Indeed, as this section will explain, the “nature” of parliamentary sovereignty in
Canada and the U.K. (in a normative sense) remains contentious. The most that can be
discerned from constitutional scholarship, taken in historical perspective, is a shifting
orientation between polarities of strict parliamentary sovereignty and what may be called
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“ancient” or “common law constitutionalism.” Simply put, while the former gives
parliament an absolute peremptory right to make law, the latter situates every legal text –
whatever its formal status – within a larger constitutional structure. As T.R.S. Allan put
it, legislative competence within a common law constitution is less a right to “make” law,
than a right to participate in its adaption.7 That is, laws may be enacted and applied, but
only within a range of “reasonableness,” within an organic constitutional framework. To
be sure, these are merely “orientations” in legal scholarship which have long ebbed and
flowed, but they do lend insight into the “nature” of parliamentary sovereignty in British
and Canadian constitutionalism.
While it is beyond the limited scope of this inquiry to undertake a thorough-going
review of the ascendency of strict parliamentary sovereignty relative to various forms of
“ancient” or “common law” constitutionalism, some attempt must be made to give a
sense of this development in order to convey the true “nature” of legislative sovereignty
as contemplated by the BNA Act in 1867. This chapter thus proceeds with a brief and
necessarily reductionist account of the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty since the
period 1800 to 1830 when common law constitutional thought last crested in English
constitutional scholarship. It is argued that this period, referred to by A.V. Dicey as an
era of “Old Toryism” or “legislative quiescence,” yielded to a gradual rise of
parliamentary sovereignty that would not abate until the late-twentieth century. An
analysis of the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty in this period will reveal a form
of legislative supremacy that is less a premise of constitutional order, than a postulate of
it.
To begin, the work of English jurists and legal theorists in the period 1800 to
1830 must be read in light of a broader reaction against the strict rationalism of the
French Revolution of 1789-99. As Maniquis has written, for late-Georgian constitutional
theorists, the violence of the Jacobin project was something so unsettlingly new, so as not
to fit within the normal “dystoles and systoles of [the] organic rhythm” of human life.8
7

TRS Allan, “Text, Context, and the Constitution: The Common Law as Public Reason”
in Douglas E Edlin, ed, Common Law Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007) at 186.
8
Robert M Maniquis, “Holy Savagery and Wild Justice: English Romanticism and the
Terror” (1989) 28 Studies in Romanticism 365 at 370-371.
14

Writers from Burke, to Halam, to John Scott, Lord Eldon reacted against the puritanical
rationalism they attributed to the Revolution by extolling an “ancient constitution” which
they felt had grown in a decidedly uncontrived way. In the distinctive tones of British
Romanticism, they appealed to antiquity, indulged heavily in organic metaphors, and
wrote in forms (notionally) construed in local and rural terms. As A.V. Dicey later
observed, for these writers, the English constitution was “a fabric more subtly wrought
than any work of conscious art.”9 In their view, it had been built up “much as bees
construct a honeycomb,”10 through slow, half-conscious growth, rather than discursive
reason.
As Leo Strauss put it, the turn of the nineteenth century affected a kind of
“emancipation of sentiment and instinct from reason.”11 The era’s juristic fixation on
things “organic” was part of this preoccupation with feeling, for by definition, the
sensory required taction or a certain closeness. The focus, then, was not on the object
studied per se, but on how it was experienced by an inquiring mind. Accordingly, the
work of jurists and legal theorists in the late-Georgian period was markedly emotive in its
tenor. The sort of history which they expressed was deeply subjective and ideational; that
is, premised on a view that it is ideas that make history and that ideas must be imparted
aesthetically. For example, Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France is infused
with lofty repetitions of the hereditary principle in English constitutionalism, with only
cursory reference to its actual historicity.12 This sort of legal scholarship yielded a
nebulous yet deeply felt form of ancient or common law constitutionalism which flattered
the period’s prevailing institutional norms.
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The effect of such appeals to organic growth and heredity was a tendency to
recognize “rights” as vested in a multiplicity of institutions.13 For example, Burke felt
that the British constitution was predicated on an institutional balance arrived at by
“slow, but well sustained progress.” By resisting excessive speculation, he wrote:
[o]ne [institutional] advantage is as little as possible sacrificed to another.
We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into
a constituent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that
are found in the minds and affairs of men. From hence arises, not an
excellence in simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in
composition.14
This short excerpt from Burke’s Reflections, written to a young partisan of the French
Revolution,15 captures both the emotive tenor of the era’s writing, and the essence of
“ancient” or “common law” constitutionalism, which sees legislative authority as
embedded within a larger body of customary and common law principles.
A century later, Dicey would argue that constitutional scholarship in the years
1800 to 1830 was of little use to modern legal science given the extent to which it was
tied-up in a dialectic with French Jacobinism.16 In his view, English jurists and legal
theorists had been so preoccupied with the disorder and blood-letting of the Revolution,
that they had taken up as their “proper task” the work of “pacification.”17 By extolling the
virtues of an “ancient constitution” they had reinforced in the law the late-Georgian and
Regency era status quo. It was in part from the holy awe with which they had dealt with
their subject that Dicey sought to distance himself in his 1885 treatise An Introduction to
the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Urging his readers to eschew the “religious
13
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enthusiasm of Burke,” and the “fervent self-complacency of Hallam,” Dicey proposed a
“modern view of [the] constitution.”18 His work would reflect the high point of a gradual
shift from a methodology imbued with British Romantism to a form of “positivism”
according to which law as to be regarded as a scientific discipline.
Again, this shift was gradual, and part of broader changes in intellectual and
cultural life. Changes in philosophical and especially epistemological concerns, strongly
affect notions of what makes for sound methodology. As Richard Bowser and Stanley
McQuade have suggested, in the mid-1800s, both the rational and the Romantic impulse
yielded increasingly to an empiricism associated with the physical sciences.19 Indeed, the
air of objectivity which Dicey sought to give his Law of the Constitution in 1885
reflected the spirit of an age which, as Bernard Hibbits put it, equated the “scientific’”
with “the ‘modern,’ the ‘good,’ and the ‘true.’”20 His focus on the empirical precluded
reliance on either the strict rationalism of natural law, or modes of thinking enamoured of
subjective human feeling. Again, methodological priorities reflect the ends to which legal
scholarship is to be put, and those ends are related to culture. In Dicey’s age, legal
scholarship was to assist in progress of an empirical kind, which did not fixate on ideal
standards.
While the constitutional theories of the late-eighteenth century had been
impressive in their theoretical depth, the “methodologies” they yielded were (by later
standards) shallow and confused. If theorists had sought truth in “reason,” and others had
sought it in the subjective experience, after about 1830, legal scholars self-consciously
demurred on questions of the law’s normativity. They instead focused on the law’s black
letter as an empirically-verifiable object of study from an objective standpoint.
18

Dicey, Law of the Constitution, supra note 10 at cxxvi.
Richard T Bowser and J Stanley McQuade, “Austin’s Intentions: A Critical
Reconstruction of his Concept of Legal Science” (2006) 29 Campbell Law Rev 46 at 46.
20
Bernard J Hibbits, “The Politics of Principle: Albert Venn Dicey and the Rule of Law”
(1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Review 1 at 7. Dicey wrote a series of articles on the
subject of legal education in which he repeatedly referred to law as a “scientific”
discipline. See AV Dicey, “Legal Education” (1871) 25 MacMillans 115; AV Dicey,
“The Teaching of English Law at Harvard” (1899) 76 Contemp Rev 742; AV Dicey,
“The Study of Jurisprudence” (1800) 5 L Mag & Rev 382; AV Dicey, “Law Teaching,
Oral and Written” in Hebert Hensley Henson, ed, A Memoir of the Right Honourable Sir
William Anson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920) 84.
19

17

Accordingly, they elevated methods of “doing” legal science to a higher level of concern.
A new emphasis was placed on the systematization of positive law, either as an end in
and of itself, or for the more forward-looking aim of reforming the law along utilitarian
lines. What is notable is that is a general retreat from theory and speculative approaches
to the law in favour of what was objectively knowable. Still, as with any cultural
development, traces of past practice remained discernable within the discipline.
The subtle pull exerted by the natural law and Romantic eras remained evident.
This was particularly so in the role played by history within legal science. Positivists like
Jeremy Benthem and John Austin, both utilitarians,21 eschewed the use of historical
insight, dismissing “what directions of human effort” went into the law’s creation as
“irrelevancies.” Neither felt that the work of a legal scholar should extend beyond the
objectively “observable phenomena” of the law’s black letter.22 In contrast, as Hoefich
has documented, the historicist methodology developed by the German jurist Friedrich
Carl von Savigny exerted a formative effect on work of English legal scientists, including
John Phillimore, William Burge, and Dicey.23 While Savigny also sought to raise
jurisprudence to the status of a science, he felt that doing so involved stressing the law’s
local origins and historical context.24 For Savigny, assiduously systemizing the law as an
organic and historically-contingent whole was meant to sustain order, not to facilitate
reform along utilitarian lines.
Thus, in spite of the discipline’s new objectivity, legal scholarship remained
affected by the polarities of the rational and the Romantic. Between the two, Dicey’s Law
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of the Constitution was clearly closer to the unhistorical, reform-oriented end of the
spectrum. While replete with historical references, his seminal work was very much a
positivist treatise, aimed at showing, among other things, the “existence” of
Parliamentary sovereignty “as a legal fact.”25 To be sure, as Hoeflich has suggested,
Dicey was not unaffected by historicist trends in legal science, but his use of historical
methodology, particularly in his Law of the Constitution, was quite secondary. His use of
historical sources was aimed at substantiating the “fact” of legislative sovereignty rather
than legitimating it in a normative sense. This methodological choice was of course a
result of the ends to which Dicey’s work was directed.
In his view, his task as a legal scholar was primarily to analyse and codify formal
legal rules so as to facilitate pedagogy and a “renovation of legal literature.”26 He
accordingly sought to cast his work as that of “neither a critic, nor an apologist, nor of an
eulogist” but merely of an “expounder.”27 Situating his work within the school of
Bentham, a man he extolled as a “genius of the rarest quality,”28 Dicey felt that law could
be thought of mathematically, and the greatest good secured by way of a utilitarian
calculus. The “Orthodox” or “Diceyan” method of constitutional theory has thus been
described as “analytical, formalist, scientific, mechanical, descriptive and positivist,”29
with little heed given to the normative questions which had so concerned jurists in the
late-Georgian period. In Dicey’s view, an era of “Benthamite Individualism” had eclipsed
the age of “Old Toryism” or “legislative quiescence” and affected a cleansing of legal
scholarship of its Romantic intonations.
A self-styled “unrepentant Benthamite,”30 Dicey’s work typified the utilitarian
school in its methodological preoccupation with systematizing and codifying the law.
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Admirers of Bentham, Dicey included, sought to restate the law in prospective, ordered,
textual instruments. This meant that Law of the Constitution took the form of a deliberate
effort to systematize a body of law that had to that point remained self-consciously
unsystematic. Dicey set out to “state” the laws of the constitution, to “arrange them in
their order,” to “explain their meaning,” and to show their “logical connection.”31 He
proceeded to identify three principles of British constitutionalism, of which parliamentary
sovereignty was “most dominant.” For Dicey, the most basic principle of the constitution
was that of an “absolutely sovereign legislature” having the “right to make or unmake
any law whatever.” This “unlimited legislative authority” operated in conjunction with
institutional convention and the rule of law, but was otherwise unnuanced.32
In summary, after about 1830, the discourse of ancient or common law
constitutionalism was gradually displaced by the principle of strict legislative supremacy.
This was due in large measure to methodological pressures associated with the rise of
legal science. Again, methodological choices depend on the questions asked by a scholar,
which are themselves embedded in intellectual and culture life. The epistemological
concerns of the age with which Dicey is associated yielded particular methodological
priorities, which in turn affected the substance of the law. Restricting itself to the
systematization of objectively verifiable legal rules, the methodology of legal science
could not account for – indeed, it sought not to account for – the unempirical claims of
late-Georgian constitutionalism. To be sure, Parliamentary sovereignty was a principle
which emerged slowly and cannot be comprehensively traced here.33 It is sufficient to
note for the purposes of this analysis, that the mid-nineteenth century, methodological
pressures yielded a principle of strict parliamentary sovereignty as a key postulate of
constitutional order in the U.K.
The “nature” of legislative supremacy in Canada was derived from traditions of
Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain. In neither country was the absolute right of the
legislature to make law a textually-entrenched premise, from which all other
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constitutional realities were necessarily deduced. To the contrary, as this section has
made clear, legislative sovereignty was a postulate arrived at rather more inductively,
through interpretation of the institutional realities of British constitutionalism in a given
historical period. That interpretation was itself heavily influenced by changing norms as
to what constitutes sound epistemology. As the rest of this chapter will indicate, the
consequence of this particular historical development, is that legislative supremacy in
Canada was comparatively easy to abridge through an expansion of the power of judicial
review in the last-quarter of the twentieth century. Again, the legislature’s authority was
long subjected to shifting institutional balances. Therefore, the “nature” of legislative
supremacy in Canada, quite apart from its scope, was highly amenable to the
incorporation of judicial review.
iii)

The Nature of Legislative Supremacy in France
The nature of legislative sovereignty in France is textually-prescribed in Art. 3 of

the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (the “DDHC”) and Art. 3 of the
Constitution of 4 October 1958, both of which are in force (en vigeur) as constitutional
instruments of the Fifth Republic.34 It is important to emphasize that the legal force of
these articles derives not from their black letter as constitutional texts, but from the extent
to which they reflect “republican principles” (principes républicains) of constitutional
value. In French constitutionalism, the textual instrument is not the “source” for a given
principle per se, but a locus of its transcription from centuries of republican literary,
philosophical and aesthetic representation. The so-called “constitutional value” of such
principles derive from their status as norms at the apex of a deductive system of truths in
development since the French Enlightenment. Like all principles of constitutional value,
those respecting legislative authority are to be regarded as innate or a priori truths,
knowable by the light of human reason and irreproachable as a matter of natural law.
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Article 3 of the 1958 Constitution iterates verbatim Art. 3 of that of 1946 (now
obsolete), stating that “National sovereignty vests in the people.” It proceeds to prescribe
that the people will exercise its sovereignty through “their representatives and by means
of referendum.” Finally, in both documents, the principle is supplemented by the proviso
“no section of the people nor any individual may arrogate to itself, or to himself, the
exercise thereof.”35 Thus, the effect of the 1946 and 1958 sovereignty clauses is to
reinforce the principle of sovereignty set out in Art. 3 of the 1789 DDHC. That is, that
“the principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation,” and that “[N]o
norporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not emante expressly
from it.” Thus, it is a principle of constitutional value in the Fifth Republic, quite apart
from its formal constitutional texts, that sovereignty resides inalienably in the “nation,”
and is to be exercised by its representatives to the exclusion of all other institutional
actors.
Given the extent to which republican principles are derived from literary,
philosophical, and artistic disciplines, it should be unsurprising that the principle of
national sovereignty enjoys a theoretical depth that belies the historical ephemerality of
French constitutional instruments. Indeed, since the DDHC of 1789 was incorporated as
the preamble of the constitution of 1791,36 the sovereignty principle has infrequently
enjoyed a status which may be considered as legally operative.37 After 1791, the principle
of sovereignty residing in the nation was in declining measures sustained by the
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constitutions of 1793, 1795, and 179938 until being displaced by the adoption of the 1804
constitution, which established the First French Empire. While the constitution of the
Second French Republic (1848-1851) reinstituted sovereignty in the nation to the
exclusion of individuals or factions, it too was rendered obsolete by the establishment of
the Second French Empire in 1851. It was not until the 1946 constitutional that national
sovereignty again had a textual basis in a constitutional document, given that the Third
Republic (1870 – 1940) lacked a formal constitutional structure.39
Indeed, as Martin Rogoff has suggested, national sovereignty is one of many
republican principles which have found their true expression in a vast body of “literary,
philosophical, and political works,”40 extending at least as far back as the Enlightenment.
In Rogoff’s view, the French Revolutionary era (1789-1804) was in essence an
“apotheosis of the Law [la Loi],” a development yielded by a century of intense literary
criticism of Ancien Régime institutions by such luminaries as Montesquieu, Rousseau,
Mably, and Diderot. To be sure, in French “la Loi,” refers to statutory law, and does not
connote constitutional norms or general principles of justice (those may be implied by the
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term “le droit.”)41 Therefore, by suggesting that the period of 1789-1804 represented an
“apotheosis of the law,” Rogoff was referring to the revolutionary ascendency of strict
legislative supremacy and the concomitant decline of Ancien Régime institutions.42 The
implication of an “apotheosis” in this context is that legislative authority, at least in
theory, attained primacy after a long process of becoming, akin to a deification.
To be sure, in this thesis, any discussion of the literary, philosophical and
aesthetic traditions from which the sovereignty principle emerged must be somewhat
cursory. It may generally be said, however, is that the French Enlightenment was
attended by a search for first principles and origins in all fields of human endeavour.
Accordingly, for most forms of French architecture, art and philosophy developed during
the eighteenth century, the effects of a “neo-classical” preoccupation with the “true style
of the ancients” is intelligible.43 This is no less true of philosophy where an ideal of the
“citizen” inspired by the Roman Republic became an objective of scholarly fixation. The
public “citoyen” was stoic, austere, and dismissive of worldly vanities. Indeed, it may be
said that literary and aesthetic trends in late-eighteenth century France reflected a
sustained deliberation on the association between primitive simplicity and virtue. It is an
association that remains at the heart of sovereignty in French republican thought.
Arguably, the most influential writer on such matters was Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(1712-1788). In his view, man, in a pre-social “state of nature,” had been happy and
good, but had been corrupted by social institutions. The social institutions of mideighteenth century France, he contended, were sustained by the conceit of “amour
propre,” or an acute awareness of, and regard for, oneself in relation to others.44 The
impulse to seek advantage relative to others had so corrupted man, Rousseau held, that
man had become defined by relations of inequity. He was materially and psychologically
dependent on other men, and as such, bound by laws to which he did not consent.
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Rousseau thus began his 1762 treatise, On the Social Contract by declaring that “[m]an is
born free, and everywhere is in chains.”45 To be sure, the manacles which he decried
were of a kind forged in the mind. For Rousseau, it was the mental bondage of “amour
propre” which gave rise to inequitable relations. Accordingly, he urged, he who “thinks
he is the master of others” would find himself “more enslaved than they.”
In order for man’s freedom to be “restored,” Rousseau wrote, man as an
individual had to be governed by the general will (“volonté genérale”). Since it was
volition that infused human action with moral content, he reasoned, in order to be
legitimately bound by a law in moral terms, the individual had to be active in the law’s
authorship. To be free in civil society, the individual was thus obliged to join with others,
as a citizen, in the work of self-government. Rousseau believed that if men gathered in a
“single body,” a general will would be discernable to the extent that it referenced
interests related to their “common preservation and general well-being.” The general will
would be “so manifestly evident” that “only common sense [would be] needed to discern
it.”46 As Judith Shklar has written, the notion of general will “conveys everything
[Rousseau] most wanted to say,” because it is a “transposition of the most essential
individual moral faculty [volition] to the realm of public experience” reconciling
individual freedom with civil society.47
It must be emphasized, however, that for Rousseau, “general will” was not
coterminous with “majority rule.” He felt that the counter-egoistic influence of a
classically-inspired form of “civic virtue” was necessary to prevent government
according to the self-interest of a majority of individuals taken in aggregate. What was
required for man to be free was a “healing education” that relieved him from the bondage
of amour propre and returned him to himself.48 The education he contemplated was one
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that enabled “natural man” to survive corrupt society. In Rousseau’s view, man needed to
rediscover “amour de soi,” a natural impulse for self-preservation which, guided by
reason and empathy (“pitié”) yielded virtue. It is for this reason that education figured so
strongly in Rousseau’s thought. The formative influence of civic virtue was required to
draw the individual out of himself, and re-orient him to the general or common good. By
definition then, the virtuous citizen was “non-particularist,”49 and saw his good as coextensive with the common good.
Rousseau’s On the Social Contract deeply influenced the drafters of the DDHC of
1789.50 This was certainly true of the Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748-1836),51 who
authored the document’s sovereignty clause in Art. 3, and prescribed in Art. 6 that law
must express the “general will.” In his highly influential pamphlet What is the Third
Estate?, which was widely-circulated prior to the convening of the Estates General in
1789,52 Sieyès urged that the standing of clergy and nobility as separate “estates” be
nullified and that all legislative authority be vested in a unicameral “national assembly.”
Such a legislative body would give expression to the “general will,” which was, he wrote,
the “source of all legality” as a matter of natural law.53 He urged that within such a body,
“private interests are bound to remain insulated” for self-government to be achieved.54
Thus, Sieyès articulated a view of sovereignty that equated the pursuit of private interests
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with the seeking of advantage relative to others, an impulse which on its face frustrated
the emancipatory purposes of political association.
In addition to the period’s most influential philosophical tracts, the republican
ideal of sovereignty residing in the “nation” was exalted in the visual arts. In the years of
the National Convention (1792-1795) and Directory governments (1795-1799) in
particular, Rousseau’s sentiments were seized upon and reified by artists with a
passionate imagination for antiquity, such as Jacques-Louis David, and his pupils, JeanGermaine Drouais, and Anne-Louis Girodet-Trioson. These artists set about reconstructing through visual representation the entire spectrum of admirable human
qualities, from displays of virtue to corporeal beauty, in classical terms.55 Calling upon
the “noble simplicity and calm grandeur”56 of antiquity as stylistic points of reference
these artists ensured that aesthetic representation in the last years of the eighteenth
century both reinforced the association perceived between civic virtue and selfgovernment, and stressed the stylistic desirability of austerity and simplicity. In doing so,
David and his disciples not only revolutionized French art, but embedded a particular
vision of republican sovereignty in the national memory.
The republican notion of national sovereignty would be richly and fulsomely
developed in a vast body of political, literary and philosophical works throughout the
nineteenth century. Importantly, it remained a relatively stable concept given the rigour
with which it was developed during the Revolutionary years. Indeed, in republican
discourse, national sovereignty was recognized as an a priori truth, as a principle of
natural law not requiring empirical confirmation. So basic and self-evident was the
principle that it was understood as a premise from which all other constitutional realities
were to be deduced. It was not, in contrast, a postulate of constitutional order, arrived at
inductively, from scholarly attempts to make sense of or to legitimate their institutions.
Were that the case, the principle may have been more vulnerable to different
methodological pressures associated with different temporal periods. The principle of
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national sovereignty, while not operative as a constitutional provision after 1804,
persisted in arts, philosophy, and literature, as an inheritance of the Revolution, and an
ideal quite independent of institutional realities.
A century later, in a lecture delivered on March 11, 1882, the philosopher Ernest
Renan reflected on the meaning of the word “nation” as it had come to be used in
republican discourse. After dismissing race, religion, language, and geography as
“essential elements” of the nation, he declared the nation to be a no less than “a soul,
[and] a spiritual principle.”57 He proceeded to delineate two constituent elements of that
principle, which he said were “in truth but one.” The “nation,” he urged, was a kind of
unity of both past and present. It was an historical concept, he held, which derived its
meaning from “a rich legacy of memories” transcribed in philosophy, literature, and art.
It was also very much a present concept, connoting “present-day consent, the desire to
live together, [and] the will to perpetuate the value of the inheritance that one has
received in an undivided form.”58 Renan’s formulation of the “nation” implicates the
importance of the history of republican thought and the term’s inextricability from
literary, artistic and other cultural expression since the Revolution.
In summary, in the Fifth Republic, sovereignty is vested in the “nation” and is
exercised by the nation’s elected representatives in a sort of trustee capacity. While it is
twice articulated in the republic’s operative constitutional instruments, its real
significance as a principle is to be found in centuries of republican philosophy, literary
and artistic endeavour. The notion of sovereignty in France remains deeply embedded in
a particular theory of republican government which emerged out of the French
Revolution of the late-eighteenth century. Indeed, it is in the context of a revolutionary
assertion of force that the principle must be understood. For instance, its peculiar stress
on the essential unity of the people as a fraternal civic community is only intelligible in
light of the social and institutional corporatism of the Anicen Régime.59 It is because of
those inequities that Rousseau and his disciples came to stress the necessity of equality
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for liberty and self-government. The natural result is a system of strict legislative
supremacy that is prima facie ill-suited to the influence of other institutional actors.
iv)

The Origins of Judicial Review as a Substantive Exercise in Canada
The historical development of legislative supremacy in Canada and the French

Republic has powerfully shaped judicial reasoning in both jurisdictions. Again, in France,
legislative supremacy was part of an assertion of national sovereignty as a principle or
norm of constitutional value with which all other laws must comport. In Canada, in the
tradition of British constitutionalism, the supremacy of legislative authority has tended to
be seen as more of a postulate, arrived at inductively from the study of institutional
realties in relation to custom and historical precedent. Arguably, the traditional view of
the role of the legislature was in Canada, at least at a conceptual level, better able to
tolerate an expanded role for judicial review when a constitutional rights instrument was
adopted in 1982.60 As this section will reveal, in Canada, the development of a
comparatively searching and fact-sensitive form of judicial review for rights violations
was further assisted by a well-established practice of review for legislative competence
with the division of powers between federal and provincial governments as required by
the BNA Act, 1867.61
Again, after Dicey published his Law of the Constitution in 1885, legislative
supremacy was the norm in Canada. As William Robson noted, by 1939 there was
“scarcely anyone who studied law, politics or constitutional history in England or the
British Dominions” who had not been “brought up on Dicey.”62 To this Mark D. Walters
added that Dicey’s celebrated treatise attained “canonical” status throughout the common
law world.63 Indeed, in their recent accounts of the role of legislative supremacy in

60

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
61
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, ss.
91-95.
62
William Robson, “Dicey’s Law of the Constitution: A Review” (1939) 38 Michigan
LR 205 at 205.
63
Mark D Walters, “Legality as Reason: Dicey, Rand, and the Rule of Law” (2010) 55
McGill LJ 565 at 565.
29

Canadian constitutional law, both Peter Hogg and Patrick Monahan have cited the
Diceyan concept of that principle as a starting point. But both have hastened to add that
the federal character of Canadian legislative institutions precluded a strict application of a
parliamentary right to “make or unmake any law whatever.” For Hogg, the federal
division of powers set out in ss. 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1982,64 “forced some
fundamental departures” from the Diceyan standard.65 In Monahan’s view, a “moderate”
form of legislative sovereignty has been applied to comport with the federal principle.66
Thus, legislative supremacy in Canada has long referred to the notion that, within
their respective jurisdictions, federal and provincial legislatures enjoy an absolute right to
make law. That is, but for questions of vires, the “sovereign power to legislate” was an
otherwise “absolute privilege”67 and could not be abridged if exercised pursuant to the
authority conferred by ss. 91 to 95. The “Diceyan” notion of legislative sovereignty was
repeatedly affirmed in early decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
and formed the basis of the principle of exhaustive distribution of legislative authority.
Per Attorny General for Ontario v. Attorney General for Canada, “whatever belongs to
self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within the
limits of the British North America Act.”68 While this dictum hints at the supremacy of
imperial statutes, its real import is the extent to which it implicates the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty as it came to be recognized in Canada. That is, an absolute
right to make law, so long as such law was enacted intra vires.
This division of powers is the basis upon which judicial review of legislation for
constitutionality developed after 1982. The strictures imposed by ss. 91 to 95 obliged
Canadian courts to invalidate laws enacted ultra vires, or outside of a legislature’s
circumscribed jurisdiction. Courts have also developed rules they have said are entailed
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by the federal principle, such as restriction on the drafting of excessively vague laws, 69
legislative inter-delegation,70 and the use of privative clauses to preclude judicial review
of statutes.71 For the purposes of this chapter, however, the focus will be on the process
by which legislation is “struck down” for violating the text of ss. 91 to 95. In certain key
respects, the way in which courts have dealt with legislation engaging these provisions
was carried over for review of alleged rights violations in constitutional rights
adjudication. As will be revealed in the rest of this chapter, the jurisprudential techniques
applied in Canada for review of statutes is highly inductive, involving a thorough-going
inquiry into the substance of the challenged law.
The normative bases for review on federal grounds are not entirely clear. In
Hogg’s view, the overriding force of the limits imposed by ss. 91 to 95 of the BNA Act,
1867 is derived from their status as imperial legislation protected from alteration by the
Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 (the “CVLA”). Section 2 of the CVLA prescribed that
any colonial law which was “in any respect repugnant” to legislation of the UK
Parliament, would, “to the extent of such repugnancy but not otherwise, be and remain
absolutely void and inoperative.”72 Thus, if either the federal or provincial legislature
purported to make law beyond the jurisdiction granted by the BNA Act, such legislation
would be voided as “repugnant” to imperial legislation. While doctrine of repugnancy
was nullified by the Statute of Westminster, it persisted as a rationale for giving primacy
to the BNA Act after 1931, due to an exception in s. 7 of that Act protecting the country’s
constituent statute from domestic amendment.73
For his part, Norman Siebrasse has argued that the doctrine of repugnancy was
not the established means of justifying review for compliance with ss. 91 to 95. Indeed, in
his work on the origins of Canadian judicial review, Siebrasse located only three cases
making explicit reference to the CVLA or to conflict with imperial statutes in order to
strike down a federal or provincial law. He urged that in fact established practice in the
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country had been to relate such measures to “excess of jurisdiction.”74 That doctrine did
not justify invalidity of a Canadian law based on its hierarchical relationship to an
imperial statute, but upon the text of the BNA Act itself as the source for the legislature’s
authority.75 While Sebrasse conceded that in practice the distinction between the two
rationales may be “so fine as to be invisible,”76 the lack of clarity as to the theoretical
basis for judicial review until 1982 again speaks to the comparatively ad hoc and halfconscious development of Canadian constitutionalism.
The best account of the normative bases of judicial review in Canada is one that is
sufficiently capacious to take in both rationales. Seabrasse’s finding of scant reference to
the CLVA or to the supremacy of imperial statues does not conclusively indicate that
repugnancy played a negligible role. Indeed, it was not in keeping with the inductive
culture of the common law for reviewing courts to elaborate on the rationale for the
textual provision they cited in applying the law absent some material reason for doing so.
Further, Seabrasse understated the extent to which the excess of jurisdiction doctrine
emerged from repugnancy as an historical rationale for judicial review. Though
conceptually distinct in the strict sense, both were sourced in the practice of English
competition law of constraining corporate ordinances by requiring that they not be
“repugnant” to the laws of the state.77 The authority of federal and provincial legislatures
in Canada must be thought of in these terms; that is, as “grants” of power, determining
the outer limits of which was an exercise in discerning the will of the UK Parliament.
In any case, since 1867, British and Canadian courts have been tasked with
arbitrating the division of powers set out in the BNA Act.78 The JCPC established early on
that a law’s compatibility with the jurisdictional limits set by ss. 91 and 92 is determined
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by an inquiry into its “pith and substance,”79 and Canadian courts have proceeded as
stare decisis. Application of the so-called “pith and substance doctrine” has generally
involved two stages, the first of which obliges the court to ascertain the “matter” of the
impugned legislation. The “matter” has been variously described as the law’s “true
meaning,” its “true nature and character,” but most commonly, its “pith and substance.”80
This determination is made by scrutinizing both the law’s purpose and its effects.81 Once
a court has identified the law’s pith and substance, it proceeds to a second stage, at which
it decides whether such a law fits within the jurisdiction conferred on the enacting
legislature by the BNA Act.
For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to note that review for compliance
with the federal principle has always been a deeply inductive exercise in which the “true”
substance of a law is probed by the court. Indeed, given the potential for legislation to
affect multiple and over-lapping “matters,” application of the pith and substance doctrine
may more accurately be said to involve identifying the “dominant” or “most important”
matter of an enacted law.82 Again, the court assesses the relevant “facts” of a statute,
namely its purpose and effects, and reasons inductively from them to arrive at what may
be said to be its “proper matter.” It is well-established that the inquiry is not a technical,
formal exercise, narrowly focused on the strict legal operation of the law. Rather,
consistent with inductive reasoning’s orientation to probability rather than absolute truth,
courts have stressed that the inquiry must be thorough-going with respect to the facts and
heavily reliant on the court’s independent judgment.
It should be added that in division of powers jurisprudence, as elsewhere, the
binding nature of precedent requires the court to reason in a highly fact-sensitive way.
The application of a rule for which a given precedent stands is of course the end point of
reasoning from precedent. That application can only take place after assiduous review of
the facts in order to determine whether a given rule applies or whether it should be re-
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formulated by carving out an exception that better suits the case at hand (what in
common law is referred to as “distinguishing”). That decision is generally arrived at in a
way that is heavily reliant on analogy, a form of reasoning which, again, only makes
sense if previous judicial decisions constitute a binding source of law. It may therefore be
said that the facts of the case are not merely the object of review, but a “tool” of review,
leveraged in such a way that would not be possible in civilian systems where the
judiciary is assigned a more passive role.
To conclude, by the time the Charter was incorporated on 17 April 1982,
Canadian courts were well-practiced in probing the substance of legislation, and delving
into the purposes for which it was enacted. In so-called “division of powers”
jurisprudence, before the “matter” of the legislation is assigned to a proper head of
power, the reviewing court engages in a thorough and often highly discretionary
assessment of the substance of the challenged law. This form of review was
complimented by the inductive nature of common law reasoning, which required
working from the facts and rendering inferences about probability. In this sense, between
the polarities of facts and principles, both of which would be engaged by a
proportionality inquiry, Canadian courts were historically oriented to facts. With the
incorporation of a supra-national tool of rights adjudication, well-established methods of
legal reasoning were brought to bear and yielded a comparatively searching form of that
test.
v)

The Origins of Judicial Review as a Deductive Exercise in France
In France, judicial review of legislation for constitutionality was incorporated in a

series of steps beginning in 1958 with the establishment of the Constitutional Council. It
is generally agreed that the competence to review promulgated statutes for conformity
with constitutional rights instruments was not contemplated by that body’s founders.83 To
the contrary, the council was set up with the general objective of ensuring the proper
functioning of French governmental institutions, with particular emphasis on protecting
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the executive from encroachment by the legislative branch.84 Notably, the Constitutional
Council did not exercise a judicial function in the strict sense, and there remains no
formal requirement that appointees have legal qualifications.85 Thus, while the 1958
constitution initiated the beginning of a form of judicial review for constitutionality, the
Constitutional Council was an essentially passive body set up in such a way as not to
compromise legislative supremacy. The first sign of a potential for real intrusion of the
council into the substantive work of the legislature would not arise until 1971.
In that year, the Constitutional Council affected an establishment of an a priori
form of judicial review in its landmark decision in Dec. No 71-33 DC (“Liberté
d’association “). Seized on 1 July 1971 of draft legislation allowing the state to withhold
recognition of an association perceived to have an “illicit purpose,”86 the proposed law
was held to offend the 1946 constitution’s preambular reference to the “fundamental
principles recognized by the laws of the Republic” (the “PFRLR”), which surely included
freedom of association.87 Thus, in what has been referred to as a “coup d’état
constitutionnel,”88 the Constitutional Council rendered legally operative a set of rights
thereafter referred to as the “bloc de constitutionalité.”89 After Liberté d’association, all
sub-constitutional laws were required to comply not only with the provisions of the 1958
constitution, but with the rights set out in the 1789 DDHC and the preamble of the 1946
Constitution, including its preambular reference to any number of unspecified PFRLR.90
It should be emphasized that until 1 March 2010, judicial review by the
Constitutional Council was only available in a narrow window after the passage of a
statute but before its promulgation,91 and only if a sufficient number of legislators
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assented to its review.92 This form of a priori judicial review effectively preserved
legislative supremacy. However, judicial review of promulgated statutes became possible
with the 2008 enactment of the Loi constitutionnelle de modernisation des institutions de
la Ve République.93 As of March 1, 2010, the date on which that reform took effect, a
party may file a petition in the course of litigation (a QPC or “une question prioritaire
constitutionnel”) to have a law reviewed for its constitutionality by the Constitutional
Council.94 The council thus engaged in full a postiori review of promulgated legislation
for conformity with the texts and principes of the bloc de constitutionalité. In doing so, it
has preserved the French practice of reasoning by deduction, which developed to give the
appearance of judicial restraint.
Indeed, the French aversion to judicial authority is deeply-rooted. Given the
extent to which the French republican tradition emphasized volition and consent for laws
to be legitimate, it is unsurprising that it was stipulated in Art. 3 of the 1789 DDHC that
no individual or body could exercise authority unless such authority emanated expressly
(émane expressément) from the people. That document’s exclusion of non-representative
institutional actors was reinforced by the constitutions of 1946 and 1958. Indeed, this
long-standing antipathy to the emergence of non-representative institutional actors, or
what Pierre Levy has called “other legitimacies,” has had a profound effect on the
development of the judiciary in France.95 Indeed, the country’s distinctive form of
judicial reasoning (which will be explored in greater depth as this analysis proceeds), was
developed to comport with a comparatively passive role that has been ascribed to the
French judiciary. The republican principle of sovereignty residing in the nation has long
been ill-suited to recognition of other sources of authority outside the legislative branch.
It should be noted this distrust of judicial authority also has a specific historical
cause. While republican resistance to the influence of “other legitimacies” is informed by
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a wide array of institutional inequities attributed to the Ancien Régime, the
unrepresentative nature of its court structure left an enduring distrust of the judicial role.
Prior to their abolition in 1789, the highest courts of appeal in France were provincial
appellate courts or “parlements,” made up of members of the nobility referred to as the
“noblesse de robe.”96 Membership in the parlements was in the vast majority of cases
based on inherited title and the influence wielded by them was widely perceived to be
inequitable.97 Accordingly, as Jean Louis Goutal has noted, since 1790 French judges
have practiced “deduction and nothing but deduction”98 in an effort to avoid the
application of judicial discretion in applying the law as developed by the legislature.
Indeed, the appearance of judicial discretion is ably avoided through strict
deduction. Heeding Rousseau’s instruction in On the Social Contract that “the scope (la
portée) of legislation is always general,”99 legal rules, including rights, most often take
the form of statements of general principle, radically compressed into broad language and
short sentences, expressing essential content but no more, through a drafting technique
known as “concision.”100 The role of the judge is to apply that law mechanically, as
though the legislature at issue “has already judged.”101 In doing so, the reviewing court
refers to the legislation using the language of “assertion, not of argument;” and renders a
decision that is “existential and descriptive, not formative and prescriptive.”102 Not
admitting of dissenting opinions and disallowing the use of verbs suggesting the exercise
of judgment by the judge,103 the court’s opinion is presented as a strict exercise in
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deduction. Through the deductive technique of syllogisme judiciare, the facts of a case
are subsumed under a general legal rule as the “end point” in chain of stringently logical
steps.
As the next chapter will show, the Constitutional Council has been able to review
legislation for compliance with the three requirements of proportionality through
essentially deductive reasoning. Prevailing methods of rights adjudication therefore
reflect both the institutional development of the Constitutional Council, which long
resisted probing the merits or “substance” of legislation, and long-established practices in
French legal reasoning more generally. Accordingly, in the context of the proportionality
inquiry, which again is a hybrid exercise, the reasoning of the Constitutional Council is
more principle-oriented, with the facts of the case taking a secondary role. To be sure, the
facts of the case are probed and evaluated in some measure but only to the extent
necessary to determine the principle under which they are to be subsumed. The facts are
not leveraged to formulate principles through induction, and the council does not, at least
in the strict sense, set precedent and craft jurisprudence as a formal source of law.
Still, the Constitutional Council does review promulgated legislation for
conformity with the constitution and its authority to do so remains un-reconciled with the
practice of legislative supremacy and the principle of national sovereignty from which it
is derived. Both Art. 3. of the 1789 DDHC and Art. 3 of the 1958 constitution expressly
deny the legitimacy of all authority that does not emanate expressly from the people (“qui
n’en émane expressément”). The text of Art 6. of the 2008 amendment, dealing with
constitutional review (“contrôle de constitutionnalité,”) does not address the upset to
institutional norms affected by an expansion of judicial review. No attempt is made to
reconcile facially discordant constitutional requirements. The amendment merely makes
provision for judicial review of enacted statutes and specifies the procedures by which it
may be sought by a complainant. The justificatory basis of judicial review therefore
remains ambiguous and subject to much scholarly debate.
The most widely accepted explanation for reconciling judicial review with
legislative supremacy and national sovereignty was developed at least as early as 1982 by
“Approaches to Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History in France” (2003) 13
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the French constitutional scholar Louis Favoreu. He developed a theory of judicial review
based on the analogy of the “pointsman” (“la théorie de l’aiguilleur”). In Favoreu’s view,
any finding of unconstitutionality would be analysed as a lack of institutional competence
by the ordinary legislator (as “le pouvoir constitué”) to make a decision solely within the
jurisdiction of the authority that made the constitution (“le pouvoir constituant”). Not
expressing a view on the substance or merits of the law, the role of the reviewing body is
merely to indicate which way ought to be taken at an unclear juncture between legislative
and constitutional procedure. The exercise is a purely procedural and highly compatible
with syllogistic reasoning. The Constitutional Council serves as a sort of “pointsman,”
directing trains down one track or another.104 According to Favoreu, so long as the
pouvoirs constitués are aligned with the will of the pouvoir constituant, the general will is
undisturbed.
While Favoreu’s “pointsman” theory forms the basis of a considerable amount of
literature on the justificatory bases of French judicial review, it has been criticized for
conflating constitutional rights instruments with the general will. It effectively forsees
two sources of general will, that to which current representatives give expression and that
of the constituent authority. In terms of the practical result of this line of reasoning, it is
difficult to argue that the idea of general will ever contemplated the authority of
unelected judges prevailing over representative assemblies in constitutional matters. It is
for this reason that Georges Vedel posited that Favoreu’s approach could be legitimated
by the potential for affected a constitutional amendment (“une révision”).105 Simply put,
in Videl’s view, the availability of constitutional revision or amendment allowed the
nation to re-assert its will over the Constitutional Council if it was so determined.
National sovereignty was therefore preserved because the elected representatives of the
nation retained final say, notwithstanding the difficulty involved in securing a
constitutional amendment.106
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It is noteable that the justifications provided by both Favoreau and Vedel
disoblige the Constitutional Council from reviewing the substance of the legislation in
question. Again, consistent with deductive modes of legal reasoning, between the
polarities of facts and principles, French jurists find themselves oriented to principles.
Again, this is not to say that they are inattentive to facts, but rather to acknowledge that
civilian legal reasoning has a different relationship to the facts than does the common
law. What is ultimately being attempted is to preserve this distinction while yielding
identical benefits through the use of proportionality principles. Whether or not such a
system can be reconciled with a deeply-entrenched principle of national sovereignty
remains contentious.
vi)

Approaches to Proportionality in Both Legal Systems are Converging
The proportionality standard has been called “the most successful legal transplant

of the twentieth century.”107 Indeed, as this chapter has suggested, the incorporation of
proportionality into Canada and the Fifth French Republic has affected a remarkably fast
and far-reaching synchronization of the machinery of rights ajudication in both countries,
despite legacies of sharply different conceptions of the judicial function and modes of
legal reasoning. Both jurisdictions now provide for judicial review of enacted legislation
where its effects may infringe a constitutionally-protected right. Again, proportionality
involves elements of inductive, fact-sensitive reasoning and deduction from general
principles. The practical effect of the adoption of that hybrid standard in common law
Canada and civilian France has been the application of a standard that is more factuallydriven in the former and more principle-oriented in the latter. In both cases, however, the
same methodological pressures are exerted, affecting a narrowing of the legislature’s
discretion in limiting constitutional rights.
It cannot be definitively said whether one approach to review of legislation is
necessarily more rigorous or searching than the other. What can be said is that if there is
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a difference between the degree of deference afforded to the legislature between the two
applications of proportionality that is related to their relative fact-sensitivity, that
differene is gradual diminishing. Both countries seem to be increasingly attentive to
foreign methodological practices when applying proportionality.108 Indeed, there is
evidence that the Supreme Court of Canada is moving toward a more principle-focused
formulation of the test. It is also clear that in its constitutional interpretation, the
Constitutional Council has elevated the influence of jurisprudence in French
constitutional law. Reference to case law, and by neccessary implication a tendency to
give greater scrutiny to facts, is pushing French constitutional review in a more inductive
direction. These developments may well suggest continued synchronization in the
methodology of proportionality in both countries.
It is the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2009 decision in Hutterian Brethren that
gives reason to believe that the application of proportionality in Canada is becoming
more principle-oriented. In that case, a majority of the court called for analytical clarity in
the application of each step of the proportionality inquiry, referring to Israeli and
European Union practice. Specifically, the majority instructed that reviewing courts
should not engage in evaluating the government’s legislative objective at the stage of
minimal impairment. Advising that minimal impairment was a strictly empirical concept,
they held that any value-laden concerns about the government’s objective should be
concluded at the final stage of proportionate effects of proportionality stricto sensu.109
For their part, the dissenting judges urged against treating the steps of proportionality as
“water tight compartments” and called for an “holistic” application of the test.110 The
effect of reinforcing the structured-nature of the test by the majority was, arguably, to
reduce judicial discretion and refocus attention on the distinct requirements of
proportionality as constitutional principles. This would make the application of
proportionality less inductive.
While it may be early to assess what the full implications of Hutterian Brethren
may be, it is clear that the application of proportionality has advanced the inductive use
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of case law in French constitutional review. To be sure, in French civil law, jurisprudence
developed by courts (“la jurisprudence”) has traditionally been regarded as an influence
but not legally binding.111 In early constitutional review as well, judicial decisions were
not treated as a source of law since, strictly speaking, they never created legal rules.
Again, consistent with the tradition of a passive judiciary, the role of the judge was
always understood to be restricted to appling pre-existing statutes or customs. But as
René David has documented, since 1971 the Constitutional Council has developed an
extensive body of case law for interpreting the Fifth Republic’s newly operative
constitutional rights instruments and for determining which principles belong in the bloc
de constitutionalité.112 However, given the need for guidance in determining what does
and does not meet the requirements of proportionality, judicial review has given new
significance to case law.
Again, while it is clear that case law has become a increasingly important
reference point for the development of the constitutional instruments of the French Fifth
Republic, it is still too early to predict whether the increasing importance of jurisprudence
in constitutional law will result in a formal change in its status. As David has
acknowledged, the increasing influence ascribed to constitutional case law still does not
make it a formal source of law. But reference to past decisions does by necessity import
reasoning by analogy and distinguishing, both of which are highly fact-sensitive
exercises. Accordingly, in some measure, the Constitutional Council is moving toward
reasoning processes which may be more inductive than is typical in other areas of French
law. Arguably, these signs of convergence suggest that differences in application are
becoming less relevant.
vii)

Conclusion
This chapter has established that legislative supremacy in Canada and the French

Republic emerged out of two very different histories. In Canada, the exclusive right of
the federal and provincial legislatures to make law within the constitutionally-prescribed
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jurisdictional limits reflected norms of parliamentary sovereignty as developed in British
constitutionalism. The legislature was deemed to be sovereign in its own right, strictly in
terms of institutional independence. But the legislature’s sovereignty was arrived at
gradually, through a slow and unsystematic historical development. In other words, its
rights were postulated from an essentially inductive assessment of its competence in
relation to other institutions. The role of the legislature in France, however, is established
by the revolutionary assertion of sovereignty as a principle from which all other
constitutional realities are deduced. That principle is a particular concept of republican
sovereignty giving the legislature the exclusive right to express the will of the nation as
trustees of their volition. It may fairly be said, therefore, that in France, legislative
supremacy was a premise of the constitutional framework, whereas in Canada it was a
postulate.
While the incorporation of judicial review into prevailing modes of legal
reasoning was easier in Canada than in the French Republic, both jurisdictions now
provide review for suspected violations of freedom of religion on what is substantively a
three-step proportionality standard. The analysis undertaken in this chapter has had two
objectives. It has sought to shed light on how proportionality as a “hybrid” analysis
involving reference to both facts and principles is able to be incorporated with relative
ease into both common law and civilian legal jurisdictions. Mainly, however, it has tried
to account for sylistic differenes in the application of proportionality in the case law that
will be referenced in this thesis. Those differences have to do with the relative factsensitivity of each application of the proportionality test and are due to the historical
development of judicial review against different conceptions of legislative supremacy in
Canada and France. As the final section of this chapter has indicated, convergence may
be still on-going and these differences diminishing.
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Chapter 3: A Comparative Analysis of the Application of Proportionality to
Legislative Limitations on Religious Expression in Canada and the French Republic
i)

Introduction
This chapter takes the form of a comparative analysis of constitutional rights

adjudication in Canada and the French Republic. It examines the methods by which the
constitutionality of legislative limitations on freedom of religion are determined in each
jurisdiction, using France’s Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 as a paradigmatic
example. That statute introduced a criminal prohibition on the concealment of the face in
public. The government of the French Republic held that such a legislation was necessary
to deter the wearing of Islamic veils or niqābs, urging that such face-coverings had a
deleterious effect on gender equality, public security, and democratic life. On 7 October
2010, the French Constitutional Council determined that the ban introduced by Law no.
2010-1192 was a justifiable limitation on freedom of religion,1 as did the European Court
of Human Rights (the “ECHR”) in its 1 July 2014 decision in SAS v France.2 While a
statute like Law no. 2010-1192, has never been judicially reviewed in Canada, the
country’s freedom of religion jurisprudence is sufficiently thorough-going to speculate as
to how a reviewing court would respond to a similar constitutional challenge.
While this analysis does explain how an infringement of freedom of religion is
established in each jurisdiction, it is primarily concerned with the application of
proportionality as an adjudicative tool. As explained in the previous chapter, review on a
proportionality standard is as a sort of “hybrid” exercise, combining inductive, factsensitive reasoning with deduction from general principles. It is for this reason that the
migration of proportionality is widely perceived as affecting a degree of constitutional
norm convergence across common law and civilian jurisdictions.3 This chapter is
intended to explore points of convergence in the way in which proportionality is applied
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in jurisdictions with divergent modes of judicial reasoning. Indeed, while review of
enacted legislation on a proportionality standard is now available in Canada and the
French Republic, in each country it is applied in such a way as to comport with domestic
modes of judicial reasoning. Thus, this analysis seeks to probe the extent of
harmonization in adjudicative methods while shedding light on the broader viability of
statutes like Law no. 2010-1192.
This chapter proceeds in six sections. In the first and second sections, the means
by which proportionality was incorporated from the law of the European Union into
Canadian and French law are reviewed. The third and fourth sections assess whether
legislative bans of the kind imposed by Law no. 2010-1192 violate the scope or content
of freedom of religion as it is entrenched in Canadian and French constitutional rights
instruments. Sections five and six examine the use of proportionality in determining
whether such an infringement would be constitutionally justifiable, with reference to the
Constitutional Council’s decision respecting Law no. 2010-1192 and to relevant
Canadian case law. At all times, this analysis is undertaken with a view to both the
methods by which proportionality is applied in each jurisdiction and its likely substantive
outcomes.
It is concluded that while a statutory ban on concealment of the face in public
may be a proportionate infringement of freedom of religion in the French Republic, it
would almost certainly be held to be unconstitutional in Canada. Substantive differences
yielded by divergent modes of judicial reasoning in each jurisdiction are negligible. The
constitutionality of such legislation would turn on the inquiry into whether it has
proportionate effect. It is the evaluative nature of the final step of the proportionality
standard, and the extent to which it requires consideration of the normative dimension of
rights that makes it decisive. Whether a deleterious effect on a right is thought to be
tolerable in a free and democratic society turns on often unarticulated notions of what it
means to be free and democratic. This is often made starkly clear in freedom of religion
jurisprudence.
ii)

The Textual Basis for a Proportionality Standard in Canada.
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) was entrenched as
Canada’s principal constitutional rights text on 17 April 1982. It established a two-stage
procedure of judicial review for potential rights violations. At the first stage, the claimant
must satisfy the reviewing court that a guaranteed right or freedom has been infringed.
This involves the court in a purposive inquiry into the “scope” or “content” of the right. If
an infringement of the right is established, it falls to the state to show on a balance of
probabilities that the infringement is constitutionally justifiable. The justificatory
standard which the state must meet is prescribed by s. 1, the Charter’s general limitations
clause:
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.4
In other words, provided that an infringement of a constitutional right or freedom is
“prescribed by law” (generally a statute or a regulation),5 it is subject to s. 1 justification.6
In its 1986 decision in R. v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada construed s. 1 of
the Charter as imposing “a form of proportionality test.”7 Writing for the court, Dickson
J. (as he then was) held that if a Charter right is found to be infringed, the reviewing
court must then ascertain whether there are constitutional justifications for limiting the
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exercise of the right by the sub-constitutional law.8 The state must first show that the
impugned law was adopted for a proper purpose. If that threshold is met, it must then
satisfy a three-part proportionality test. It must show that the measures it adopted are
“rationally connected” to its legislative objective (that is, the law’s proper purpose), that
those measures impair the right “as little as possible,” and that there is a proportionate
relation between the deleterious effects on the right and benefits accrued.9 With few
modifications, the “Oakes test” remains the standard for determining the legitimacy of
sub-constitutional limits on constitutional rights in Canada.10
In developing the Oakes test, Dickson J. seems to have drawn from the ECHR’s
case law interpreting limitations clauses in the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “Convention”).11 As noted in the
previous chapter, from its origins in nineteenth century Prussian administrative law,
proportionality as a legal construct migrated to German Basic Law, and from there to the
law of the European Union. By the late-1970s, the formal three-step structure now
associated with proportionality was more or less fully developed by the ECHR. Indeed, in
its 1979 decision in Sunday Times, that court articulated a test that was quite similar to
Oakes. It held that “interference” with the right to freedom of expression under Art. 10 of
the Convention must be “prescribed by law,” have “legitimate aims,” be “necessary” to
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achieve those aims, and be commensurate with the values of a democratic society.12
Thus, when it wrote Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have drawn directly
from case law on constitutional limitations clauses in the EU.
iii)

The Textual Bases for a Proportionality Standard in France
It must be recalled that review of legislation for conformity with constitutional

rights instruments first became available in the French Republic with the Constitutional
Council’s 1971 decision in Dec. No 71-33 DC (“Liberté d’association”).13 In that
decision, the council affected an establishment of a form of a priori judicial review for
the constitutionality of legislation prior to its promulgation. In doing so, it rendered
legally operative (“en vigeur”) two constitutional rights texts.14 The so-called
constitutional bloc (“le bloc de constitutionalité”) established in Liberté d’association
included the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (“the DDHC”) and the
preamble of the Constitution of 13 October 1946. That document, among other things,
makes reference to “the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic”
(the “PFRLR”). The council relied on the 1946 preamble to justify a broad and openended authority to identify principles of constitutional value not transcribed in either
constitutional text. In 2004, the Charter of the Environment was added as the third
operative rights document of the French Fifth Republic.
The Constitutional Council’s decision in Liberté d’association was an important
step on the way to full a postiori review, which was finally made available with the
constitutional reform law of 2008.15 As explained in the first chapter, the Constitutional
Council had been established by Title VII of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 as a
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weak and deferential institution, tasked with a range of rather technical responsibilities,
most notably, arbitrating the division between the competence of the legislature (over
statute law) and the executive (over regulations).16 The drafters of the constitution of the
Fifth Republic did not contemplate judicial review of legislation. To the contrary, as the
Travaux préparatoires of that document reveal, they recognized French constitutional
culture as “extraordinarily hostile to judicial review.”17 Thus, when the Constitutional
Council was instituted, the supremacy of the legislature to the judiciary was still wellentrenched. Its 1971 decision in Liberté d’association marked a departure from that
order, initiating the gradual incorporation of review of promulgated statutes.
The introduction of a priori review in 1971 both perpetuated the traditional
French conception of the organic unity of legislation and law, and exacerbated its
attendant confusion of legislative and constituent authority. While the council’s new role
did not upset legislative supremacy in a technical sense, it did effect the legislative
process to the extent that Parliament began to act with a view to the council’s institutional
competence. For instance, the mere prospect of a petition for constitutional review
(generally brought by opposition parties) and possible censure deeply influenced policymaking.18 This phenomenon, which accelerated throughout the 1980s, has been referred
to as the “juridicization” of French legislative institutions.19 During that time, the
council’s willingness to obstruct the legislative process increased and its case law gained
increasing pedagogical authority. Part of this process involved the incorporation of evermore searching standards of review, to bring France into alignment with rights norms and
practices of other EU member states.
Not long after the Constitutional Council assumed the power to review legislation
prior to its promulgation, it provided reassurance that its role was in no way legislative,
but strictly limited to assessing acts of the legislature for conformity with constitutional
16
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texts and principles. In Decision 74-54 DC of 15 January 1975 (also known as the
“Abortion I” decision)20 the council held: “[T]he Constitution does not confer on the
Constitutional Council a general or particular discretion (un pouvoir général
d’appréciation ou de décision) identical to that of Parliament, but simply, empowers it to
rule on the constitutionality of statutes referred to it.”21 In other words, the Constitutional
Council established that did not have the competence to “second guess” Parliament on
questions of policy.22 Accordingly, it developed a single standard of review for
constitutional review which it termed “manifest error” (erreur manifeste).23 On that
standard, absent an error so egregious that it could not “escape a man of good sense,”24
the council could not interfere.
After about 1982, the standard of manifest error gradually evolved into a more
rigorous means-end rational review. While certain rights retained the highly deferential
standard of manifest error, others became subject to review for rational connection and
necessity of the means adopted by the legislature in light of its objectives. In Decision
2002-461, for instance, (also referred to as “Juvenile Justice”), the council declared
certain “educative sanctions” imposed on young offenders to be constitutional by
acknowledging the importance of education to prevent breaches of the public order and
noting that the sanctions “naturally take into account the familial and educational
obligations of the interested parties.”25 Described as a “proportionality” standard by
French jurists and academics, this standard of review was far less evaluative than its
three-part counterpart in European law, evincing an on-going unease in questioning
legislative policy choices, which the Constitutional Council saw as falling within the
legislatures “domaine de non-contrôle.”
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It was not until 2007, not long before the constitutional revision which established
a procedure for a postiori review, that the Constitutional Council supplemented its
“proportionality” standard with consideration of the legislation’s “possible consequences
(conséquences possibles). In Dec. 2007-255 (“Loi en faveur du travail”), for instance, the
council upheld certain targeted tax benefits aimed at rewarding work and stimulating the
acquisition of a principal residence by the taxpayer. In deciding that the impugned
legislation did not, inter alia, violate the principle of equality before public burdens in
Art. 3 of the DDHC, the council engaged in a brief discussion of the merits of the
legislation and its potential harms to constitutional rights.26 This was substantially an
inquiry into proportionate effect or proportionality stricto sensu. It should be
remembered, however, that review for proportional effect remains the exception. The
standard applied by the council is more or less deferential depending on the text of the
rights provisions engaged. The following sections will explore this rather abstract notion
in more concrete terms.
iv)

Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in Canada
It must be recalled that the Canadian Charter’s general limitations clause, s 1,

contemplates a two-stage procedure of judicial review for a potential rights violation. At
the first stage, the reviewing court has to determine whether the challenged law has the
effect of limiting a guaranteed right. Ascertaining the scope of the right, in terms of its
content and outer contours, involves a purposive interpretation of its text.27 The Charter’s
guarantee of freedom of religion is prescribed in s. 2(a):
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion28
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The Supreme Court of Canada has formulated a test for determining when the right to
freedom of religion has been abridged, which the clamant must satisfy on a civil standard.
In the case of a legislative ban on concealment of the face in public, it is the first hurdle
which anyone making a freedom of religion claim under s. 2(a) would have to surmount.
In terms of the methods of judicial reasoning to be applied, it is fair to say that
constitutional review in Canada is comparatively inductive and fact-sensitive. Reflecting
the culture of a common law jurisdiction, reviewing courts arrive at legal probabilities
based on the facts with reference to binding precedent. In the constitutional context, the
relative rigour with which a reviewing court can probe the facts at hand has been
reinforced by the fact that constitutional review for rights violations has only ever been
available ex post; that is, through the application of constitutional law to a specific case.
In other words, review does not take place in the abstract but with regard to actual legal
cases that raise constitutional questions in the context of litigation. Determining whether
the scope of freedom of religion under s. 2(a) is infringed would therefore involve a
comparatively probing and thorough-going inquiry into the facts being litigated at a very
low level of abstraction.
In its 2004 decision in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem,29 the Supreme Court
defined the scope of “freedom of religion” with reference to three criteria distilled from
its s. 2(a) jurisprudence. The Court held, and has since repeatedly affirmed, that freedom
of religion consists of the right to “undertake practices or harbour beliefs having a nexus
with religion,” which an individual “sincerely believes or is sincerely undertaking in
order to connect with the divine or as function of his or her spiritual faith.” It is not
necessary, the court added, for such practices or beliefs to be objectively required by a
recognized religion.30 Accordingly, the court in Amselem had to develop a definition of
“religion” that was sufficiently capacious to account for what it called a “personal or
subjective” conception of the right, but that was still serviceable given the text of the
right and the requirement that the expression at issue have a “nexus with religion.” In
29
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other words, it had to give “some outer definition” to a concept that it conceded could not
be defined with precision.31
Justice Iacobucci, writing for the majority in Amselem, gave “religion” a broad
and “purposive” definition, consistent with the canons of Charter interpretation.32 He
held that,“[d]efined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive
system of faith and worship,” and “tends to involve belief in a divine, supernatural, or
controlling power.”33 More importantly, however, he held that the “essence” of religion
for the purpose of s. 2(a), had to do with “freely and deeply held personal convictions or
beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith.” That is, religion as it is used in
Canadian constitutional (and indeed quasi-constitutional)34 texts is not coextensive with
recognized religious institutions or doctrines, but denotes beliefs “intrinsically linked to
one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfillment” and practices which “allow individuals to
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of [their] spiritual
faith.”35 Thus, to establish an infringement of “religious” expression under s. 2(a), a
reviewing court will focus on the factual indicia of the inward nature of the belief and the
depth of feeling with which it is held.
In arriving at this definition of “religion” for the purpose of s. 2(a), the court in
Amselem expounded upon its earlier case law, including its first s. 2(a) decision in the
1986 case of R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.36 In that seminal decision, Dickson J. did not
define “religion” per se, but construed the text of s. 2(a) in such a way as to give primacy
to “personal choice” and “individual autonomy.”37 Reflecting at some length on the
history of the Protestant Reformation in England, he reasoned that freedom of religion in
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Canada was rooted in an historical recognition by the state that “belief was not amenable
to compulsion” and that there existed a “reality of individual conscience.”38 Accordingly,
he held, the rights to both freedom of religion and to freedom of conscience under s. 2(a)
were in fact a “single integrated concept,” which was meant to confer protection on
beliefs of a kind recognized as integral to individual autonomy and personhood.
The Amselem decision both clarified the scope of freedom of religion and
reinforced the centrality of “personal choice” to a s. 2(a) claim. It did so in two key
respects. First, in overturning the conclusions of the Quebec Court of Appeal, Iacobucci
J. held that reviewing courts may not inquire into whether or not the belief or practice at
issue is objectively required by a religion. It is not the “mandatory or perceived as
mandatory nature” of the religious expression that attracts protection under s. 2(a), he
reasoned, but its “religious or spiritual essence.”39 Thus, to fall within the scope of s. 2(a),
the claimant need only establish on the facts that she subjectively believes that her
conduct is required by her religion. The belief or practice need not be legitimated by
established doctrine in any objective sense. To require an objective basis for religious
expression, Iacobucci J. held, would both improperly engage a reviewing court in the
arbitration of religious doctrine40 and undermine the importance of autonomy and
individual choice to freedom of religion, as settled by earlier case law.
Secondly, while the majority precluded speculation as to a religious practice’s
“validity” in light of recognized doctrine, custom, or ritual, it did give reviewing courts a
measure of latitude to probe the sincerity with which the belief is held. It hastened to add,
however, that inquiries to that end must be “as limited as possible,”41 so as not to offend
the deeply personal nature of the right. Therefore, the Court advised, the need to establish
the claimant’s “sincerity” or “honesty of belief”42 is a question of fact that goes no further
than what is necessary to establish her “good faith,” and that her putative belief is
“neither fictitious nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice.”43 To meet this low
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threshold, the claimant may adduce evidence to show that the practice at issue is
consistent with her “other religious practices at the time of the alleged interference”44
Again, Iacobucci J. stressed that this test must be alive to both the “intensely personal”
nature of the right, and the need to avoid the “invidious interference” of the state.
It should be also be noted that, in its early s. 2(a) jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court of Canada indicated that freedom of religion under s. 2(a) may be subject to
“internal limits.” Quite apart from s. 1 of the Charter, which does not affect the “scope”
of a right, “internal” limits are inferred from the text of the right itself and speak to its
content or outer contours. For instance, some of the earliest s. 2(a) case law shows a
willingness to deny protection to the religious expression of parents whose conduct poses
a risk of harm to their child. It was in such a context that in the 1993 case of P(D) v S(C),
L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for a majority, held that freedom of religion is “inherently
limited by the rights and freedoms of others.”45 Similarly, in Young v Young, McLachlin
J. (as she then was) affirmed that where a parent’s religious expression jeopardizes the
best interests of a child, “it is clear that the guarantee of religious freedom can offer no
protection,” and recourse to a proportionality analysis under s. 1 is not appropriate.46
While in recent years Canadian courts have shown a preference for denying such
claims under s. 1 rather than under s. 2(a), they continue to recognize internal limits
where the interference with the right would be “trivial or insubstantial.” That is, as
Dickson J. put it in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., religious beliefs and practices are
protected by s. 2(a) to the extent that they might “reasonably or actually be threatened.”
For a state-imposed burden to be proscribed, he added, it must be “capable of interfering
with religious beliefs or practices.”47 This somewhat abstractly formulated rule serves as
a tool for dispensing with challenges to legislative or administrative action which on its
face has come to be recognized as constitutionally permissible. In other words, an
internal limit to the right exists where the application of a thorough-going proportionality
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analysis would be patently unnecessary. It is with “a view to the underlying context” of a
rights claim, it has been held, that the ultimate standard of protection will be measured.48
If a Canadian court were to review a legislative ban on the wearing of the full
face-veil or niqāb in public places, it is all but certain that it would find a violation of s.
2(a). In its 2012 decision in R. v NS, the Supreme Court had to determine whether a
Muslim woman was required to remove her niqāb when testifying in order to afford the
accused the full measure of his s. 11(d) rights to make full answer and defence to the
charges against him, given the centrality of face-to-face communication historically
ascribed to that right. In spite of a three-way split in their reasoning, every member of the
court agreed that to oblige a Muslim woman to remove her veil constituted an
infringement of her right to freedom of religion under s. 2(a). The claimant NS professed
that she wore the veil as an expression of her faith as a Muslim. Accordingly, that the
practice of veiling had a “nexus” with religion as defined in Amselem was not contested.
Writing for the majority, McLachlin C.J. found that the lower court in N.S. had
erred in finding that the claimant evinced a lack of sincerity. The preliminary inquiry
judge had inferred a lack of sincere belief from the claimant’s inconsistent use of the veil.
McLachlin C.J. held that in doing so, he had confused the strength of N.S.’s belief with
the sincerity with which it was held. Inconsistent adherence to a religious practice, she
held, “may suggest lack of sincere belief, but it does not necessarily do so”49 given that
religious belief may vacillate over time without being an “artifice,” or a claim made
capriciously or in bad faith per Amselem. Thus, the threshold for establishing the
sincerity of a religious belief is very low.50 More generally, in light of the low bar for a s
2(a) violation set by Amselem, it is incontrovertible that a law of general application
requiring the removal of face-veils would be found to violate freedom of religion. Again,
this would trigger s. 1 of the Charter, shifting the burden to the state to provide that such
a law is justifiable.
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v)

Establishing an Infringement of Freedom of Religion in France
Modes of constitutional adjudication in the French Republic do not lend

themselves to questions pertaining to the “scope” or “content” of freedom of religion.
French legal reasoning proceeds deductively, largely by way of what is called judicial
syllogism (syllogisme judiciare), a deductive technique developed to preserve legislative
supremacy and to give an air of judicial passivity. As this analysis will show, it is applied
by taking two contending general principles, and subsuming the facts at hand under one
or the other as a sort of “end point” in a chain of logical inferences from those principles.
Thus, the facts take a secondary role to principles when contrasted with common law
reasoning. To speculate as to the “scope” of a right is an inherently inductive exercise,
more aligned with common law practice, aimed at preemptively clarifying when a given
set of facts will trigger a legal principle. In other words, questions of “scope” by their
nature direct the mind to facts, when French rights adjudication is far more oriented to the
general legal principles engaged by a case.
Accordingly, this section aims not so much to delineate the content of freedom of
religion per se, but to establish the principles that support a rights claim and to reflect on
their interplay. It must be recalled that in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council,
it is not so much the black letter of the right which is being litigated, but the principles
which are recognized as transcribed by that text. In other words, textual provisions cited
in constitutional texts are to be thought of less as discrete and more or less insular
provisions, than as principles of “constitutional” or the highest value in a hierarchical
system of norms. As was the case in the Constitutional Council’s 2010 decision
respecting the prohibition on the veil, multiple constitutional principles are often
implicated by a given set of facts, and in concert shape the deductive process by which a
result is reached, as section four of this analysis will reveal.
It is critical to establish from the outset that the Constitutional Council’s decision
on the veil was not the result of a specific constitutional challenge brought by a private
individual or group with standing. Rather, Law 2010-1192 had been referred to council
on 14 Sept. 2010 by the Presidents of the National Assembly and of the Senate, for a
priori review as provided for in the second paragraph of Art 61 paragraph 2 of the
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Constitution.51 Thus, the council did not have to decide whether a particular provision
was engaged by the law in the strict sense.52 Review by the council was undertaken with
a more general view to whether the legislation conformed with a range of principles of
constitutional value (the so-called bloc de constitutionalité). The council’s decision,
released a month later on 7 October 2010, dealt with four constitutional provisions which
it determined were potentially engaged by the referred legislation. It arrived at that
determination by way of a reasoning process not indicated in the text of its decision, but
which necessarily precedes any deductive analysis.
Indeed, as a rule, French judges and members of the Constitutional Council do not
account for the process by which the general principles adjudicated are determined.
Certainly, the established practice of the Conseil d’État and the Cour de Cassation is to
focus on logical deductions from pre-determined premises. Neither court elaborates on
how these premises are identified at the outset. But as Eva Steiner has put it, the essential
task of the judge is in fact to find “‘correct’ premises,” and that cannot be done by way of
deduction alone. To the contrary, it involves reliance on induction, analogy, and judicial
discretion.53 It is for this reason that the text of judicial decisions tends not to
acknowledge the search for appropriate premises. In the context of the Constitutional
Council’s review of Law 2010-1192, it is clear that the four constitutional provisions
cited had to be arrived at by some process of judicial reasoning given that no provisions

51

Prior to 1973, Art 61 of the prevailing constitution of the Fifth Republic allowed only
four officials to refer acts of Parliament to the Constitutional Council after their adoption
but before their pomulgation by the President of the Republic and their entry into force:
the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly
and the President of the Senate. In 1974, Art 61 was amended to allow 60 Deputies
(members of the National Assembly) or 60 Senators to refer a legislative act to the
council. The constitutional reform law of 23 July 2008 amended Art 61 to allow for the
the Cour de Cassation or the Counseil d’État to refer a statue already in force to the
council for consideration of its constitutionality during the corse of a proceeding, subjet
to certain conditions.
52
It should be noted that while ex post review of enacted legislation is now available,
modes of judicial reasoning remain essentially deductive, as they had developed under
the practice of a priori review.
53
Steiner, supra note 48 at 151
58

were specifically cited by the Presidents of the National Assembly or Senate upon
referral of the legislation for a priori review.54
In her study of French legal reasoning, Steiner asserts that French judges do not in
actual practice begin by stating premises or applying general principles. Rather, she
observes, they begin with “some complicated and confusing case” out of which premises
gradually emerge from “analysis of the total situation.”55 Again, the text of the judicial
opinion does not account for this process, but merely states its results in formal and
laconic language. Choosing the premise or general principle from which a result will be
deduced is a necessary first step requiring a certain engagement with the facts. The judge
must then make interpretive choices, as well as engage in the weighing of conflicting
interests and policy considerations.56 The necessary search for “correct” premises or
applicable principles, in Steiner’s view, is thus one of the main “limits of syllogistic
reasoning”57 The search for appropriate principles is accordingly left un-articulated in the
text of the decision so not to give the appearance of judicial discretion in the application
of the law.
Thus, the Constitutional Council’s review of Law 2010-1192 was based not
merely on the provisions cited in its decision, but on the entire constitutional bloc. That
is, the draft legislation was referred to the council to be assessed for conformity with four
documents and a larger body of constitutional principles developed in constitutional case
law. It may be recalled that the bloc de constitutionalité includes the text of the
Constitution of 1958, the individual rights set out in the DDHC of 1789, the “political,
economic, and social principles” enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution of 4
October 1946, the Charter of the Environment of 2004, and a body of non-textual
PFRLR. The four provisions cited by the Constitutional Council in its reasons as general
principles governing the case are the only principles within that potentially vast body of
law which the council determined to be implicated by the legislation under review As
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Steiner put it, those provisions were identified as the “correct premises" of the decision
by a preliminary analysis of the facts referred for a priori review.
The council held that four constitutional provisions were engaged by the
government’s proposed legislative ban on concealment of the face in public, three of
which are contained in the DDHC of 1789 (Arts. 4, 5, 10), while the fourth is in in the
preamble of the Constitution of 1946 (Art 3). The relevant provisions are:
Art. 4. La liberté consiste à pouvoir faire tout ce qui ne nuit pas à autrui
: ainsi, l'exercice des droits naturels de chaque homme n'a de bornes que
celles qui assurent aux autres Membres de la Société la jouissance de ces
mêmes droits. Ces bornes ne peuvent être déterminées que par la Loi.58
Art. 5. La Loi n'a le droit de défendre que les actions nuisibles à la
Société. Tout ce qui n'est pas défendu par la Loi ne peut être empêché, et
nul ne peut être contraint à faire ce qu'elle n'ordonne pas.59
Art 10. Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, même religieuses,
pourvu que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l'ordre public établi par la
Loi.60
Art 3. La loi garantit à la femme, dans tous les domaines, des droits égaux
à ceux de l'homme.61
It is may be noted that the council’s reasons in Dec. 2010-613 rely only on textuallyprescribed principles and not on PFRLR or other non-textual principles. While both enjoy
equal weight as principles of constitutional value, for comparative purposes, this analysis
deals only with textual provisions in both jurisdictions.

58

Art 4. Liberty consists of the freedom to do everything which injures no one else;
hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which
assure other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can
only be determined by law.
59
Art. 5. The law can only prohibit such actions as are hurtful to society. Nothing may be
prevented which is not forbidden by law, and no one be forced to do anything not
provided for by law
60
Art. 10. No one shall be disturbed on account of his opinions, including his religious
views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order as determined by
law
61
Art. 3 The law guarantees women equal rights to men in all spheres.
60

Finally, before proceeding to discuss the application of proportionality to the ban
on the veil as a sub-constitutional limit on a constitutional right to freedom of religion, it
is critical to note that the four provisions cited in Dec. 2010-613 were not litigated
individually or in their own right. Rather, the provisions are to be read somewhat in
aggregate, and thought of as a more or less singular articulation of freedom of religion for
the purpose of the law being reviewed. From the perspective of a common law tradition
in which the discrete provisions of a constitutional text have controlling force, the French
approach is quite different. But it must be recalled that in common and civil law
traditions, there are often different ways of conceptualizing problems and of articulating
solutions. The French Cartesian tradition places a particular emphasis on abstract
thinking and evinces a corresponding lack of interest in empirical detail. Accordingly, it
is not appropriate to strictly adhere to the black letter of each textual provision during the
adjudicative process, but to think abstractly, with a view to the general principles at play.
vi)

The Application of the Proportionality Test in Canada

a) Proper purpose
Under the Canadian Charter, the first step of s. 1 justification requires the state to
establish that it enacted the impugned legislation for a “proper purpose.” That is, it must
have legislated with a view to a sufficiently important objective. The determination of
whether a legislative objective is “sufficiently important” involves three rather valueladen considerations. As Dickson J. held in Oakes, a legislative objective will be accepted
as sufficiently important where it is “pressing and substantial” as opposed to merely
trivial, and directed to the “realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”
Further, from a normative standpoint, the legislative objective must not be discordant
with the values of a “free and democratic society.”62 As legal concept, these requirements
are remarkably under-developed given that they have been held to be met in all but a few
cases to have reached the Supreme Court of Canada. Indeed, the Court has only struck
down a law for having an improper purpose once, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart.
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Accordingly, Big M remains the Court’s most authoritative pronouncement on
improper or inadmissible objectives under the first stage of a s. 1 analysis. In that case, it
invalidated federal Sunday-closing legislation for having been enacted with a religious
purpose. Specifically, the Court determined that the objective of the impugned legislation
was to coerce observance of the Christian Sabbath and not, as the government had
argued, to provide a non-sectarian “common day of rest.”63 According to the majority,
not only did the legislative history indicate a religious purpose, but the legislation could
not have been enacted by the federal government as valid criminal law without one.64 In
contrast, in Edwards Books, the Court was able to ascribe to provincial Sunday-closing
legislation an objective of providing a common day of rest.65 While both laws had the
effect of privileging observance of the Sunday Sabbath, only the legislation at issue in
Big M was determined to be intolerable in a free and democratic society.
In distinguishing the facts of Edwards Books from those of Big M, the Court
reflected at some length on what constitutes an inadmissible legislative objective under
the first stage of Oakes. Again, the effect of the legislation was similar in both cases. The
purpose for which the Sunday-closing law in Big M was enacted, however, was
determined to be a “purely religious” one, evincing an intention to “bind all to a sectarian
Christian Ideal” through positive law. As such, the Court held, the law represented “a
form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter,” given that document’s multicultural ethos and its broad guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion.66 In
contrast, the element of coercion in constitutionally-protected matters was not present in
Edwards Books, where the legislative purpose was found to be the provision of a
common day of rest for retail workers, and not a “surreptitious attempt to encourage
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religious worship.”67 Accordingly, the purpose was held to not to offend Charter values
as envisioned by the text of s. 1.
The Court’s reasons in Big M and Edwards Books suggest that a law will not
satisfy the “proper purpose” inquiry where its objective is intended to discourage the
exercise or enjoyment of constitutional rights. This is not to say that a statute or common
law rule cannot in their effect limit a s. 2(a) right; to the contrary, they routinely do. 68 The
first stage of s. 1 justification does not consider the means chosen by the legislature to
realize its objective, or their potential deleterious effect on constitutional rights. Rather,
the proper purpose inquiry reflects an evaluative and valued-laden component of s. 1
justification that is focused narrowly on the propriety of a given legislative objective in
light of the standard implied by the words “free and democratic society.” The extent to
which the legislator’s concerns are “pressing” or of “fundamental importance” has come
to be definitively tied-up with this normative inquiry and have rarely brought about the
invalidation of a law in their own right.
Determining whether a legislative ban on the concealment of the face in public
would pass the first stage of s. 1 justification is difficult in the absence of actual
legislation or a legislative record. It is from such sources that Canadian courts ascertain
the legislative objective, and that task is often wrought with practical and theoretical
difficulties. In other constitutional courts, judicial review of legislative restrictions on
face-coverings have acknowledged the existence of three legislative objectives, namely,
public safety, gender equality, and maintaining the minimum requirements for democratic
life.69 While prevailing modes of legal reasoning in those jurisdictions may be able to
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deal with multiple legislative objectives,70 the tendency of Canadian courts is to ascertain
a singular objective, given the relative intensity with which they focus on the factual
matrix at hand. Where a single legislative objective is illusory, they strive to narrow their
focus to “the characterization that most directly relates to the reason for violation the
constitutional right.”71
In practice, this may be avoided given the tendency of Canadian legislatures to
draft laws with a relatively searching form of judicial review in mind. Indeed, like all s. 1
requirements, the need for a legislative objective to be “pressing and substantial”
presupposes a fairly inductive form of judicial review. Accordingly, courts have
interpreted it as imposing an evidentiary burden which must be met. It is for this reason
that a ban on concealment of the face would likely be framed in narrower, and more
negative terms. For instance, rather than draft the law with a view to advancing gender
equality, a Canadian legislature would be more likely to be found to be acting to address
the “harm” to gender inequality associated with the practice of veiling. Likewise, a ban
legislated in the name of security or democratic life, would be enacted and justified with
an emphasis on the harms perceived to be associated with concealment of the face in
public. To be sure, the evidentiary threshold is low, and the government need only proffer
evidence to support “a reasoned apprehension of harm”72 to discharge its burden.
While there is every indication that public security and gender equality are
appropriate bases for limiting s. 2 rights,73 it is far from clear that the objective of
maintaining the necessary standards for democratic life would be admissible at the first
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stage of s. 1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sauvé v Canada is instructive on this
point. In that case, the Court struck down a legislative provision that denied to persons
imprisoned for two years or more their right to vote as guaranteed by s. 3 of the Charter.
In so, doing the Court split five to four on the admissibility of “philosophically-based or
symbolic” legislative objectives. Writing for a majority, McLachlin C.J. held that “vague
and symbolic objectives make the justification analysis more difficult” because they do
not speak to the necessity of the limit on the right “in concrete terms.” For this reason,
she held, “demonstrable justification requires that the objective clearly reveal the harm
that the government hopes to remedy.”74 Further, she held, ““broad, symbolic objectives”
such as “enhancing civic responsibility" and “good citizenship” have been held to be
“problematic.”75 Accordingly, it is clear that on whatever basis the government sought to
justify its legislation, it would have to do so with reference to a reasoned apprehension of
concrete harm.
b) Rational Connection
If the reviewing court is satisfied that the impugned legislation has been enacted
for a proper purpose, it then falls to the government to prove that the means it has
adopted are rationally connected to that purpose. In other words, at the second stage of
Oakes (and the first stage of proportionality), the government must establish “a causal
connection between the infringement and the benefit sought on the basis of reason and
logic.”76 The Supreme Court has explained the role of the rational connection inquiry as
ensuring that limitations on rights should not be “arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational
considerations.” While this conception, first articulated in Oakes, has not been formally
re-visited by the Court, there is some evidence that it is moving away from the language
of “fairness” at the rational connection stage. Indeed, as Aharon Barak has noted, that
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language is problematic to the extent that it suggests an evaluative role for the Court in
what is essentially an empirical inquiry.77
Indeed, in its decision in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the
Court urged against conflating the search for a rational connection with more value-laden
considerations better left to the final “balancing” step of proportionality. It stressed that
“[t]he issue at the stage of rational connection is simply whether there is a rational link
between the infringing measure and the government’s goal.”78 Beyond the search for
such a link, the reviewing court should refrain from questioning the wisdom of means
chosen by the legislature. It is well-established, for instance, that the state is not required
to prove that the measures it has adopted will optimally realize its legislative objective. It
need only show that it is reasonable to suppose that the limit may further its objective.
Furthermore, the measures may advance the legislative purpose partially or inefficiently
and still pass the rational connection test. Simply put, the rational connection inquiry is a
second threshold test, which will be met where the legislature can point to the “reason” or
“logic” of the measures it has adopted.79
A legislative prohibition on the concealment of the face in public might well pass
the rational connection branch of s. 1 justification. To be sure, a more definitive
conclusion in this regard would require actual legislation with an identifiable purpose and
means. It is unclear whether it could be established that the three legislative objectives
already considered (security, gender equality, and maintaining the minimum standards of
democratic life) are in fact compromised by public veiling. If it can be so established, the
evidentiary record for each potential harm will likely be different. For example, while
there may be significant evidence that the veil undermines gender equality,80 evidence
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suggesting its harm to public security or democratic participation may be scant. It must
be recalled, however, that to establish a rational connection all that is required is enough
evidence to disoblige the court of any notion that the means adopted by the legislature are
arbitrary or illogical.
Indeed, the requirement of a rational connection is widely recognized in both
Canadian case law and legal scholarship as being a burden which may be easily
discharged. Again, evidentiary support for harm or the potential for harm can be slight.
The Supreme Court has established that in most cases the evidentiary basis for means
adopted by the legislature may be “admittedly inconclusive,”81 and has indicated that the
inquiry is really about finding a “common sense connection.”82 Again, this suggests that
the evidence needed to show the logic of the legislative scheme may be minimal. With
respect to the three legislative objectives already discussed, if the state had adduced
evidence at the first stage of Oakes to show that a ban on the veil was meant to respond to
harm associated with veiling, the same evidence may be serviceable to show a rational
connection between the prohibition on concealment of the face and the prevention of that
harm.

c) Minimal Impairment
As the preceding two sections have noted, very few laws reviewed under s. 1 have
been struck down during the preliminary “proper purpose” inquiry or at the so-called
“rational connection” stage. Furthermore, the requirement of proportionate effect at the
fourth and final step of Oakes has also played a marginal role in constitutional rights
adjudication.83 The vast majority of laws that have failed s. 1 review, have done so at the
“minimal impairment” or “least drastic means" branch of Oakes. In fact, the second stage
of Oakes has been so consequential that one constitutional law scholar has called it “the
“heart and soul of s. 1 justification.”84 However, in Hutterian Brethren, the Supreme
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Court signaled a more structured and formal approach to minimal impairment which may
give new importance to the final branch of Oakes. The final two steps of s. 1 justification
are analysed here with the Court’s reasons in Hutterian Brethren firmly in mind.
The second stage of Oakes requires the state to establish that the legislation under
review impairs the constitutional right or freedom it engages “no more than is reasonably
necessary” to achieve the law’s objective. The word “reasonable” is important because it
indicates that while the legislature is obliged to use the least restrictive means available to
it to realize its objective, it enjoys a degree of deference or “room to maneuver” in
determining what those means are. This so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine
recognizes that that legislature is better-suited to making policy, particularly where
complex social and economic issues are involved. Accordingly, the Court has held that
review for minimal impairment does not require that the limitation on a right be
“perfectly calibrated,” only that it is “reasonably and demonstrably justified.”85 Thus, a
law will be “minimally impairing” of a constitutional right where it falls within a range of
reasonable alternatives available to the legislature.
The effect of the court’s decision in Hutterian Brethren was to re-fortify the
legislature’s margin of appreciation in determining the most effective means of achieving
its objective. In that case, a small, insular religious community called the Hutterites
challenged a regulation introduced by the Alberta government requiring all driver’s
licenses in the province to include a photograph of the license-holder. They objective
based upon their religious belief that the Second Commandment prohibited them from
willingly being photographed, and insisted on an exemption to the photo requirement. In
rejecting the Hutterites’ claim, the majority held that an exemption would defeat the
government’s objective, which was to reduce identity fraud associated with the licensing
system by ensuring one-to-one correspondence between each license and a photo of the
license-holder in a digital “photo bank.” For her part, Abella J., writing in dissent,
resisted the notion that the absolute integrity of the photo-bank was necessary to
substantially satisfy the government’s objective.
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The majority in Hutterian Brethren held that a reviewing court is not competent
to re-configure or modify the policy determination made by the legislature as the most
effective means of realizing its objective. As McLachlin C.J. put it, in the case of the
photo bank, the demand for an exemption, “instead of asking what is minimally required
to realize the legislative goal, asks the government to significantly compromise it.”86 If
the legislature determines that a one-to-one correspondence was necessary for the system
to be effective, the court must not engage in speculation as to “how effective” the system
needs to be. The rational connection and minimal impairment tests are not evaluative but
empirical, in the sense that they are “essentially determined against the background of the
proper objective, and are derived from the need to realize it.” In this way the legislative
goal, which has been found to be pressing and substantial, “grounds the minimal
impairment analysis.”87
Provided that the reviewing court does not readjust the legislative objective at
minimal impairment, a statutory ban on concealment of the face in public might well be
accepted. Again, this has a great deal to do with the relative breadth with which the
legislature defines its purpose. If allowing for exemptions to the prohibition on veiling
would substantially defeat the government’s purpose then the court may well accept a full
ban as minimally impairing. As McLachlin C.J. noted in Hutterian Brethren, freedom of
religion cases often involve this sort of “all or nothing dilemma.”88 Where providing a
religiously-based exemption, for example, would defeat the purpose of the ban, as it
would seem to here, then the ban may well be found to be minimally impairing.
d) Proportionate Effect
The final step of s. 1 justification engages the court in a balancing exercise to
determine whether the legislation being reviewed is proportionate in effect or
proportionate stricto sensu. Citing the work of former Israeli Supreme Court President

86

Ibid at para 60.
Ibid at para 54.
88
Ibid at para 61.
87

69

Aharon Barak,89 the majority in Hutterian Brethren, held this step involves a court
“placing colliding values side by side and balancing them according to their weight.”
Canadian courts have typically referred to this exercise as balancing the salutary effects
of the legislation with its deleterious effects on the constitutional right. President Barak
has written elsewhere that, on his methodology the inquiry into proportionate effect is in
fact “the most important of proportionality’s tests.”90 While it has historically played a
quite marginal role in the application of Oakes, there is good reason to believe that the
more empirical and less evaluative approach to minimal impairment developed by
President Barak has gained influence in Canadian constitutional law, and may make the
final step of Oakes more consequential.
Indeed, in Hutterian Brethren, McLachlin C.J. stressed the importance of
differentiating the rational connection and minimal impairment analyses from the inquiry
into proportionate effect. In her view, while the latter invites the court to engage in value
judgments, the first two steps of proportionality are far more empirical, and do not invite
the court to “read down the government’s objective.”91 This distinction, she held, drawn
by President Barak, is “a salutary one,” although one “not always strictly followed by
Canadian courts.”92 The government’s objective, and the means adopted by the
legislature to realize it, are not to be altered, but determined to be constitutional or
unconstitutional as they are at the final step of Oakes. This approach re-affirms the
legislature’s constitutionally authority to make policy-decisions, while at the same time
vesting in the reviewing court a highly discretionary authority to strike down laws which
are perceived to be insufficiently beneficial to justify the infringement of constitutional
rights.
This sort of balancing or weighing of values engages the normative dimension of
constitutional rights. To assess whether an infringement on a right is tolerable in a “free
and democratic society” requires the reviewing judge to have some notion of what is
implied by the words “free” and “democratic.” At this step in s. 1 justification, the court
89
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imports, whether consciously or unconsciously, historical and cultural pre-notions of
what makes for a good society. As far back as Big M, the Supreme Court has articulated a
strongly individualistic theory of religious freedom under s. 2(a) as part of a more general
s. 2 ethos which regards rights as essentially negative, to be exercised against the state.
While the Court has tended to articulate this particular rights paradigm as though it were
axiomatically the only meaning that could be ascribed to the words “free and
democratic,” it does reflect an ideological orientation derived from Canada’s intellectual
and cultural history.
Consistent with this individualistic rights ethos, legislation tends to be struck
down at the final step of s. 1 justification where its salutary effects on society are
perceived to be too abstract or speculative. In Trinity Western, for example, the court
found that a risk was overly speculative, citing insufficient evidence that potentially
discriminatory beliefs were actually result in discriminatory conduct. What was required,
the court held, was “concrete evidence” of the harm apprehended.93 Similarly in
Amselem, “security” concerns posed by the construction of Succot on balconies in an
apartment complex were also held to be “speculative” in the absence of evidence of a
“tangible impact.”94 It should also be recalled that in Sauvé the Court refused to reconcile
a highly abstract legislative objective as being sufficiently important to over-ride a
Charter right. Under this model, then, the state has relatively little room for passing laws
of general application with predominantly abstract or symbolic dimensions.
Furthermore, deleterious effects on rights, including freedom of religion, are
considered by a reviewing court in light of broader Charter values, specifically, “liberty,
human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy.” As the majority
held in Hutterian Brethren, “liberty” is the “most fundamental” of such values, and in the
case of s. 2(a), the “right of choice in matters of religion.”95 This emphasis on individual
choice and the right to be left undisturbed by the state can be traced back to Dickson CJ’s
seminal s. 2(a) decision in Big M. Subsequent case law has held that a negation of
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individual choice in matters protected under s. 2 is highly deleterious, and the more the
right is negated, the more intolerable the harm is considered to be. This was surely the
case in NS, where veiling was held to be an expression of individual choice and the
degree of interference with that choice was total.96
Thus, while a legislative ban on concealment of the face in public may well pass
the first three steps of a s. 1 analysis, it is all but certain that it would fail on the final
inquiry into proportionate effect. Again, this has to do mainly with the speculative and
somewhat abstract nature of such legislation’s salutary effects on gender equality, public
security or democratic participation. Balanced against this is a very concrete and farreaching deleterious effect on a s. 2(a) right. It is important to understand that this
particular weighing of the different values engaged reflects a particular individualistic
approach to constitutional rights. While this normative dimension of rights adjudication
has often found expression at the minimal impairment branch of s.1 justification, postHutterian Brethren, it will likely be considered at the stage of proportionality stricto
sensu. That stage of s. 1 justification is poised to take on new significance, for as the next
chapter of this thesis will suggest, the historical and cultural dimension of rights remains
critical, in spite of increased synchronization in the methodology of rights adjudication
across legal systems.
vii)

The Application of the Proportionality Test in France

a) Proportionality is Applied Syllogistically
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In reaching its result in Dec. 2010-61, the Constitutional Council subsumed the
facts relating to Law 2010-1192 under one of two contending principles after a process of
strict deduction, during which it justified its deductive inferences with reference to the
requirements of proportionality. Again, Dec. 2010-61 takes the form of a laconic sixparagraph statement of the law, admitting of no references to precedent and no reliance
on analogy or other inductive techniques which typify the common law. Its language is
therefore “existential and descriptive,” rather than “formative and prescriptive.”97 It is a
short decision, even by the standards of the Constitutional Council. Before delving into
the council’s reasons with respect to Law 2010-1192, it is critical to recall why French
rights adjudication is so distinctively terse. While the first chapter of this thesis examined
French legal reasoning from an historical perspective, in this section it is worth briefly
considering how French deduction takes place from a doctrinal standpoint.
As Constitutional Council member Jacqueline de Guillenschmidt has stated, the
Constitutional Council strives to apply the law in a non-discretionary manner, with “With
the common sense that since Descartes has been equally shared among all men.”98 For his part,

Descartes opined that by way of “quite simple and easy” reasoning, not unlike “analytical
or co-ordinate geometry,” even the “most distant” truth may be arrived at.99 The starting
point, he reasoned, must be a broad and general principle ascertained by the “indubitable
conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely based on the light of
reason.”100 From a basic principle, he advised, which is often the “simplest object and
[therefore] easiest to know,” other less apparent truths might be discerned through strict
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deduction.101 In other words, from a principle known with certainty, other correct
propositions can be inferred as following necessarily. Descartes’ deductive methodology
deeply imbued French legal theory, legislative drafting and juristic form. As suggested
earlier, the Cartesian premise that truth is logically antecedent to experience powerfully
reinforces a posture of judicial restraint.
The French Cartesian tradition, in stark contrast to the common law, places a
premium on abstract thinking and gives a corresponding lack of attention to empirical
detail. The Constitutional Council thus presents the results of constitutional litigation as
logical deductions from more fundamental principles. Deductive inferences are justified
by the fact that constitutional rights are conceived of as norms from which sub-ordinate
norms derive their force of law. As Hans Kelsen put it, a norm, whatever its formal legal
status, is only binding if the entity commanding it is “authorized” or “empowered.” to
issue that command. This presumes a normative order in which all law is situated.102
Drawing deductive inferences involves identifying more specific norms as following
logically from general norms, in light of the need for the higher norm to “empower” it.
Through the deductive technique of syllogisme judiciare, the facts of a case are subsumed
under a more specific norm as the “end point” in chain of stringently logical inferences.
Accordingly, the role of the judge is represented as “applying” the law somewhat
mechanically, as though the law being discussed “has already judged.”103 However, as a
standard of judicial review, proportionality invariably involves the reviewing court in
some degree of evaluation and “balancing,” which would seem antithetical to traditional
Cartesian methods. While French jurists commonly state that proportionality has always
been the essence of deduction, it is undeniable that French adjudicative techniques have
evolved to adapt to the incorporation of a standard of review that is necessarily somewhat
inductive. It is clear that considerations of proportionality now inform how the
Constitutional Council thinks about how legal norms are to be reconciled. This is evident
from its use of the language of proportionality to justify its deductive inferences As this
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section will show, in the case of Dec. 2010-61, this equated to a terse and syllogistic
reasoning process which incorporates consideration of proper purpose, rational
connection, and minimal impairment to establish a proportionate infringement of a rights
norm.
It serves to recall that none of the constitutional texts of the Fifth French Republic
contain a general limitations clause from which a requirement of proportionality for
rights limitation can be inferred. Still, Jacqueline de Guillenschmidt has referred to
proportionality as “la pierre angulaire du contrôle de constitutionalité.”104 In her view,
while the requirement of that legislative abridgments of constitutional rights be
proportionate does not emanate from the black letter of a single, discrete textual
provision, it is an adjudicative norm which has long pervaded the republic’s
constitutional rights instruments. Accordingly, in French constitutional interpretation,
proportionality has traditionally been treated as “un principle mouvant, impossible à
définir dans l’absolu et nécessairement contigent.”105 This approach has had the effect of
forestalling the development of the sort of structured, formal approach to judicial review
for proportionality which has taken hold in other jurisdictions, and of ensuring that
proportionality requirements would be inferred from the text of the rights being
adjudicated.
Nevertheless, the term “proportionality” does have a meaning in a norm sense,
even if the stringency of its application as a legal standard varies depending on the
language of the rights norms at issue. For any sub-constitutional limit on a constitutional
right to be “proportionate,” it must, in general terms, be “équilibré, mesuré, [et]
raisonable.”106 While this triadic standard always “underwrites” interpretation of rights
and their limits in France, as de Guillenschmidt has noted, it is rarely clearly expressed in
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council.107 Those three normative criteria are used
by the council to measure the adequacy of the statutory standard to the legislative
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objective and to ensure a balance between the infringement of a right and the public
interest.108 Depending on the rights norms at issue, this may mean a standard of manifest
error, a “soft” form of proportionality focussed on necessity or minimal impairment, or a
rigorous three-step test that includes a weighing of the law’s “possible consequences.”
For instance, the Constitutional Council has generally used a far less exacting
standard of review for environmental or social rights (“droits de créance”) than for
legislation affecting liberty rights.109 While the former often retain a standard of manifest
error, most of the latter now demand application of a full three-step proportionality test,
or what French jurists refer to as the “triptych allemand.”110 The three-part means-end
rational review with scrutiny for minimal impairment and proportionality stricto sensu
has been applied, for example, to ensure that a deprivation of the right to liberty is
“strictly and obviously necessary’ per Art. 9 of the 1789 DDHC. In contrast, Art. 5 of the
2004 Charter of the Environment, which ensures the imposition of precautionary
measures by public authorities to prevent environmental damage, has been found to
attract a standard of review akin to manifest error.111 Again, this variability has to do with
the relative breadth of legislative maneuverability conferred by the right as suggested by
its text.
It must be recalled, however, that what is being reviewed is the competence of the
legislature to make law given the constitutional principles engaged. In French
constitutional rights adjudication, those principles are conceived of less as discrete textual
provisions than as norms of the apex of a hierarchical order which both limit and
empower all sub-constitutional laws. In other words, constitutional principles or norms
dictate at the highest level of abstraction how all legislation and subordinate legislation is
to be interpreted or applied. In most cases dealt with by the Constitutional Council,
including Dec. 2010-61 respecting concealment of the face in public, a number of textual
108
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provisions in several constitutional texts are implicated. The constitutional principles
implicated by those provisions are read as informing and complimenting one another.
Thus, the council is not adjudicating the black letter of individual textual provisions in
relation to the facts, but setting out the constitutional norms engaged by a particular set of
facts in the most abstract of terms.
Accordingly, the rights provisions engaged in Dec. 2010-61, (that is, Articles 4, 5
and 10 of the DDHC and Article 3 of the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946), must be
read as a priori truths which inform each other. Article 4 of the DDHC is a general
liberty right, prescribing that the exercise of an individual’s “natural rights” may only be
limited to ensure the enjoyment of these same rights by others. It further prescribes that
such limits “shall be determined solely by the law.” Article 5 circumscribes the
legislature’s authority to set such limits by stating that it may only limit rights where their
exercise is harmful to society. Article 10 suggested that freedom of religion is a natural
right within the meaning of Article 4, and may only be limited in the interest of “public
order,” which to be consistent with Article 4 must involve the prevention of some harm.
Finally, Article 3 of the 1946 preamble, obliges the legislature to legislate with a view to
ensuring gender equality.
From these provisions, the Constitutional Council postulated two general contending
principles: the broad liberty right of the individual to freedom of religion and the right of
the legislature to limit that right to prevent societal harm, including harm of a gendered
nature. With the single deductive inference that places of public worship (lieux de culte
overtes au public) were not part of the “public order” for which the legislature could
make law, the council proceeded to subsume Law no. 2010-1192 under the principle of
legislative authority to make law for the public order. Again, this is an very short
decision, and generally broad constitutional principles such as those involved in this case
yield a chain of inferences to get to propositions sufficiently narrow to take in the facts at
hand. Still, in arriving at its decision, the Constitutional Council made full use of the
requirement of proportionality to justify its inferences. The proportionality criteria which
the council felt were engaged by the principles it cited were proper purpose, rational
connection, and minimal impairment or necessity.
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a) Deductive Inferences are Justified With Reference to Proportionality’s
Requirements
First, the Constitutional Council acknowledged that Law no. 2010-1192
prohibiting the concealment of the face in public had a proper purpose. Again, it should
be recalled that the proportionality standard in France grew out of the stand of manifest
error, and the council retains the ability to invalidate legislation with “arbitrary or
abusive” purposes, the error of which “could not escape a man of good sense.” In general
terms, the standard of manifest error equates to the proper purpose inquiry in Canadian or
EU law. On this point the council reviewed the legislation and held that Law no. 20101192 was “intended to respond to practices which until recently were of an exceptional
nature, consisting of concealment the face in public.” It proceeds to note that the
legislature had felt that such practices were at odds with public safety, gender equality
and the minimum requirements of life in society, and more general the constitutional
principles of liberty and equality.112 Implicit in these reflections on the legislative
purpose, is an subtle acknowledgement that there is nothing manifestly inappropriate
about it.
Secondly, the Constitutional Council acknowledged (again, in rather existential
and descriptive terms) the proportionality of the means adopted by the legislature in Law
no. 2010-1192. Immediately preceding its discussion of legislative purpose, the council
noted that “when enacting the provisions referred for review, Parliament has completed
and generalized rules which previously were reserved for ad hoc situations for the
purpose of providing public order.”113 This statement of legislative means suggest their
innate rationality, as a logical extension of measures already existing to meet the needs of
a developing situation. Given that a rational connection is generally considered to be a
non-arbitrary or non-capricious one, a “completion and generalization” of existing rules
cannot fail to meet that standard. Further, the reference to “public order” has a particular
constitutional meaning. The legislature is empowered to make law for the “public order,”
a term which draws its normative dimensions from other constitutional provisions setting
112
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out the democratic character of French institutions. The implication is that if the
provision developed for ad hoc situations were “rational,” then their adaptation to a more
general phenomenon will be as well.
In the fifth paragraph of its six-paragraph decision, the council held that Law no.
2010-1192 minimally impaired on the right to freedom of religion. Again, the legislative
objective is not a shifting standard but must ground the minimal impairment analysis.
Accordingly, the council noted that “in view of the purpose which it sought to achieve,”
the legislature had achieved a conciliation which was not disproportionate (une
conciliation qui n’est pas manifistement disproportionné) between safeguarding the
public order and guaranteeing constitutionally protected rights.114 It proceeded to note,
however, that the legislation could not apply to places of worship frequented by the
public without constituting an excessive burden on the exercise of freedom of religion.115
Thus, for the council it followed logically there was no less intrusive way to realize the
legislative objective of preventing the harm associated with the niqāb than by prohibiting
it in public places that do not have a specific religious purpose. In other words, veiling
could be permitted in places of worship without undermining the legislature’s goals with
respect to public order.
Importantly, the Constitutional Council did not conduct a balancing of the
legislation’s salutary and deleterious effects. Again, this would have required the
reviewing court to weigh contending values against the framework of what is required by
a democratic society consecrated to the realization of “liberty” and “natural rights.” The
fact that this inquiry was not conducted in Dec. 2010-61 suggests that it was not inferred
by the council as required by the text of the rights provision they were applying. More
accurately, it may be said that the rights paradigm the council felt was implied in
determining proportionate effect was sufficiently well expressed by a more limited
inquiry into whether the legislature had acted in manifest error, had used irrational
means, and unduly impaired the rights of the individual. In a normative sense, the balance
that French constitutionalism seeks to achieve between the rights of the individual and
the needs of the whole of which he is a part is sufficiently accounted for in the softer
114
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form of proportionality used in Dec. 2010-61, without recourse to consideration of
possible consequences.
a) Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the application of proportionality in Canada and the
French Republic to legislative limits on the constitutional right to freedom of religion. It
has used France’s recent legislative ban on the wearing of full face veils in public as an
example which has implications for other freedom of religion cases in each jurisdiction.
To be sure, each country undertakes the proportionality analysis using starkly different
forms of legal reasoning. While Canadian rights adjudication is imbued with the
empiricism and fact-sensitivity of the common law, French jurists place a premium on
abstract and conceptual thinking. For the French Constitutional Council, proportional
limitations on rights are knowable by the virtues of logic, and not as a by-product of
litigation. Nevertheless, in recent decades both jurisdictions have incorporated the
principles of proportionality into their approach to constitutional review, affecting an
impressive synchronization in methods of rights adjudication.
As this analysis has shown, both systems are able to bring the same principles to
bear through their respective methods of judicial reasoning (ie. whether fact-oriented or
principle-oriented). Differences in substantive outcomes resulting from differences in
reasoning methods appear to be negligible. In other words, neither Canadian nor French
legal reasoning necessitates a more rigorous application of the proportionality standard.
Both constitutional authorities are likely to assess for a proper purpose (or the absence of
a manifest error), a rational connection, and minimal impairment and arrive at more or
less the same result, irrespective of the method of judicial reasoning used. Both forms of
judicial reasoning strive to reconcile the right with its potential to be limited, and in doing
so arrive at a window within which it must decide whether or not to defer to the
legislature.
In the case of a prohibition on the veil, the matter turns on the final step of the
analysis; that is, the inquiry into proportionate effect. The Canadian approach invites a
reviewing court to assess the harm occasioned by the ban against a normative backdrop
that sees liberty as a negative right of the individual to be left unmolested by the state.
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The individual and the state are conceived of as existing in fairly rigid dichotomy, with
the interests of the collective being represented by the legislature and the interests of the
individual being represented by the courts. For its part, the French Constitutional Council
did not conduct a proportionate effects inquiry, which in effect allowed it to assess the
limitation against a backdrop which does not percieve of the state and the individual
existing in as rigid a binary. Indeed, as the next chapter will explain, even where the
Constitutional Council conducts a proportionate effects inquiry it is done in such a way as
to comport with this more legislature-centric normative backdrop.
The normative dimension of rights, understood as the extent to which they are
historically and culturally contingent, remains critical to determining justifiable
limitations on rights. As with other constitutional rights, the normativity of “freedom of
religion” is most evident when the reviewing authority considers whether the effects of a
legislative limitation on that right is proportionate in the strict sense. Accordingly, the
next chapter takes the form of a deeper and more concentrated analysis of the
proportionate effects or balancing stage of proportionality. By analysing the way in
which balancing takes place from the perspective of each jurisdiction’s intellectual and
cultural development, the normative dimensions of democratic life and religious liberty in
Canada and the French Republic can be better understood.
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Chapter 4: How the Proportionate Effects Test Acts as the Main Vector for the
Expression of Constitutional Culture
i)

Introduction
This chapter attempts to shed light on the role of constitutional culture in the

application of the proportionality test as tool of rights adjudication. It suggests that the
“proportionate effects” or “balancing” stage of that test is the main vector for the
expression of the cultural dimension of rights because it engages a reviewing court in
appraisals of what is good or acceptable in a given jurisdiction. In the first two chapters
of this thesis, it was suggested that courts in Canada and the French Republic have
adapted proportionality to comport with their domestic modes of legal reasoning. This
chapter explores how rules for applying the proportionate effects test have been
judicially-developed so that balancing reflects prevailing rights norms in each country. It
concludes that while the migration of proportionality has brought about a degree of
harmonization in the methodology of rights adjudication, the constitutionality of
limitations on rights such as freedom of religion still turns largely on both articulated and
unarticulated normative considerations distinctive to different jurisdictions.
The legal rules developed by courts for application of the proportionate effects
test are used to anchor a discussion about the cultural nature of constitutional balancing.
That discussion is based upon the observation that while the proportionate effects test is
part of a legal standard developed at a supra-national level, fundamental valueconsiderations of order and purpose are ascribed to it in the jurisdiction applying it. In
other words, an instrumental “steering function” is expected of the proportionate effects
test when it is applied in a particular legal system.1 This chapter suggests that the nature
of those value-considerations are best understood with reference to the constitutional
culture in which the standard is being applied. The term “constitutional culture” is used to
suggest basic, historically-developed “shared meanings” and interpretive perspectives in
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a jurisdiction’s constitutional law.2 This chapter aims to move beyond a narrow or
positivistic comparative analysis by exploring how the legal rules of balancing in each
jurisdiction reflect their respective constitutional cultures.3
An historicist approach is used as the most effective means of exploring the
“shared meanings" that inform balancing in each jurisdiction. This chapter does not seek
to ascribe historical causes to contemporary legal issues. Nor does its use of history
reflect an attempt to give a comprehensive review of the development of legal norms or
institutions in Canada or France. The aim of this chapter is in fact far less ambitious. An
historicist methodology is used to isolate a narrow distinction in legal reasoning in each
legal system in the context of the balancing stage of proportionality. By relating that
distinction to historical patterns, this chapter suggests a far greater degree of organicism
in the law relating to constitutional rights than is generally acknowledged in legal
scholarship. The recognition or non-recognition of particular substantive rights, it is
suggested, is related to but not co-extensive with these underlying patterns in thinking
about rights.
Accordingly, differences respecting the constitutionality of legislative restrictions
on religious expression, such as prohibitions on concealment of the face in public, can be
explained by a divergence in the way rights are conceptualized. That divergence finds its
expression mainly in the proportionate effects stage of proportionality. It is argued that
the Canadian approach to balancing reflects the empiricism of the common law, while the
French approach is distinctly rationalistic. While the common law tradition tends to see
liberty in a negative sense, as an individual right to be left unmolested by the state, the
latter sees the state as having an important role in advancing liberty through a formative
project of fraternal and egalitarian citizenship. The legal rules of balancing have been
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developed to reflect these ends. Thus, it is the legal rules of balancing, and not specific
doctrines of secularism per se, which are responsible for the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of restrictions on religious expression in the public sphere.
ii)

The Proportionate Effects Inquiry: General Observations
In most jurisdictions, constitutional review on a proportionality standard requires

a preliminary inquiry into whether the law under review has a “sufficiently important
objective,” followed by a three-part “proportionality test.” That test involves assessing
the impugned legislation for: a “rational connection” between its objective and the means
adopted to realize it, minimal impairment of the constitutional right, and a proportionate
relation between the salutary effects of the law and its deleterious effects on the right. It
is critical to appreciate that the final step of proportionate effects (known in the law of the
EU as “proportionality stricto sensu”) is conceptually distinct from those that precede it.
Taken together, the first three requirements represent a “means-end analysis,” focused
narrowly on the relation between the legislative objective and the legislative means. In
contrast, the test for proportionate effects assesses the relation between the legislative
objective and the constitutional right. While the first three inquiries are primarily
empirical, the fourth is evaluative in the sense that it involves a rather more subjective
“balancing” of values.4
To be sure, the preliminary question of whether the law has a sufficiently
important objective can be described as evaluative to the extent that it involves a court in
determining whether a legislative objective is “good” or “acceptable” in a constitutional
democracy. That inquiry, however, is focused narrowly on the admissibility of the law’s
purpose, and the bases upon which a purpose can be rejected as improper are generally
few and well-defined. Improper purposes are particularly clear and accessible to
reviewing courts because they tend to be articulated in the constitutional text itself or in
relevant case law,5 and do not involve the same level of speculation as questions dealing
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with the potential effects of a law. In other words, the legislative intent involved tends to
be either patently unacceptable or not. Thus, the proper purpose inquiry is conceptually
like the rational connection and minimal impairment tests both in the sense that it is
focuses on the relation between the law’s limiting purpose and the means selected to
achieve it, and because of the primarily empirical nature of its application.
The requirements of a rational connection and minimal impairment are not
evaluative and do not engage the court in value judgements. The test for a rational
connection between the means used by the legislation and the purpose it was designed to
fulfill is empirical. It involves verifying as a matter of fact some sort of connection,
however slight, between legislative means and ends. Again, such means may advance the
legislative objective badly or inefficiently and still be rational.6 Similarly, the minimal
impairment or necessity test does not invite a reviewing court to evaluate the legislative
purpose or the need to realize it.7 The legislative objective remains fixed and grounds the
inquiry. The aim of minimal impairment is to filter out cases in which the same level of
realization of a legitimate legislative objective can be achieved at less cost to
constitutional rights.8 While some level of judicial discretion is invariably applied,9 at
minimal impairment the court is charged only with ruling out gratuitous limitations on
rights.
The final step of the three-part proportionality test is different. It departs from
consideration of the legislative ends and means, and focuses on the effects of the law. The
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court evaluates those effects through a balancing of its potential benefits and the harm it
might cause to the rights of affected individuals or groups. It involves the reviewing court
in determining, not whether a given level of rights-enjoyment combined with the
realization of other interests meets a particular legal test, but whether it is good or
acceptable in a given context.10 While scholars have advanced a range of methodological
proposals to lend greater structure and formalism to the exercise and to prevent it from
becoming “a playground of subjectivity”11 the balancing process remains
“methodologically obscure” in most jurisdictions. It is generally recognized that the
balancing stage of proportionality involves an “insurmountable” element of subjectivity12
given the extent to which it engages value judgments.
The inherent subjectivity or “crudeness”13 of the proportionate effects test stems
from the fact that, in order to measure whether there is in fact an an adequate congruence
between the benefits gained by a law and the harm it may cause to constitutional rights,
the reviewing court must be able to “quantify” the net gain and loss of a particular
legislative initiative. That is, the values in conflict must, at their precise point of conflict,
be infused with a certain weight, a weight which ultimately derives from context. The
interaction of the value with particular factual circumstances inevitably engages judicial
discretion and subjectivity. The proportionate effects test, therefore, cannot avoid a high
level of subjectivity. The most that can be done is for judges to develop legal rules to
guide balancing. The legal rules of balancing signal certain principles to which courts
must refer when applying that stage of the proportionality standard.
As this chapter will show, when developing such rules courts are working from
the text of the limitations clause of the constitutional document. Starting from the
language used to justify limitations on rights, they bring to bear, both consciously and
unconsciously, a particular way of thinking about rights that is organic to the legal system
of which they are a part. They both read in particular political and philosophical

10

Rivers, supra note 8 at 200.
Bernard Schlink, “Proportionality” in Michael Rosenfeld and András Sajó, eds, The
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) at 724.
12
Ibid at 725.
13
Rivers, supra note 8 at 201.
11

86

ideologies, historical and cultural realities, including general notions of the structure of
the political system,14 and import particular modes of reasoning which affect rights
balancing in less explicit ways. In a sense, during balancing, judges are at once conscious
articulators of certain aspects of the constitutional culture, and unconscious transmitters
of other aspects. It is for both of these reasons that the final step of the proportionality
analysis gives expression to the extent to which constitutional rights are historically and
culturally contingent.
iii)

Canadian Constitutional Culture Reflects a Common Law Heritage
The most important aspect of Canadian constitutional culture for the purpose of

this analysis are those which engage very basic questions about traditional forms of legal
reasoning. Those reasoning practices pre-existed the incorporation of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”), and were subsequently leveraged in its
interpretation. From a comparative perspective, the most distinctive feature of Canadian
constitutional reasoning is its empiricism and non-speculative character. As this section
will suggest, this fact-dependence and aversion to abstract reasoning is an inheritance of
common law practices which developed in Britain in the eighteenth-century. Indeed, it is
a key contention of this thesis that, even after the incorporation of a constitutional rights
instrument and a robust system of judicial review, Canada may still be justifiably referred
to as a common law constitutional culture. This is in large measure due to the extent to
which the country’s common law heritage continues to make itself felt in constitutional
review.
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was suggested that the late-Georgian period,
extending roughly from the years 1760 to 1830, exerted an enduring influence on the
development of “ancient” or “common law constitutionalism.” It was argued that
common law constitutionalism is not so much a discrete theory of legislative competence,
as it is a theoretical orientation, situated opposite of the principle of strict parliamentary
supremacy. Simply put, common law constitutionalism suggests that authoritative legal
texts – whatever their formal status – are to be interpreted as elements of a larger,
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historically-contingent constitutional design, admitting of both written and unwritten
sources.15 A consequence of that sort of arrangement is that courts are obliged to interpret
general or ambiguous texts with reference to custom and precedent, rather than original
understanding.16 Such an interpretation is based on a recognition that a legislative text is
embedded in a particular constitutional context, from which it derives both its meaning
and its legitimacy as a source of law.
To be sure, the distinction between the two ways of conceiving of parliament’s
role tended to be more theoretical than practical. Throughout the nineteenth century,
Parliament exercised its authority within a context established by custom and past
practice, but was effectively unfettered by other institutions. The importance of studying
the discourses relating to parliament’s role lies in the extent to which they shed light on
the organic development of British constitutional culture. The historical period during
which common law constitutionalism last crested is important to that task because it
reinforced certain aspects of that culture, as influential actors endeavoured to define what
they regarded as a cumulative and coherent tradition from the influence of the French
Revolution. Jurists and legal scholars of the period represented British constitutional
culture as inherently ill-suited to the sort of abstract rights discourses taking place in
revolutionary France. The constitutional culture of Britain, it was argued, was essentially
empirical and unspeculative, having developed incrementally in a relationship of codependence with the common law.
Indeed, among the most important influences on late-eighteenth century jurists
was British “empiricism,” a philosophical tradition exemplified by the writings of such
figures as John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. In the most general terms,
that tradition could be distinguished from the “rationalism” of continental Europe based
upon the question of whether the human mind is possessed of any “innate” ideas.17 While
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the answers given in both traditions are variegated and deeply nuanced, it may be said
that for the eighteenth century British empiricists, human knowledge derived only or
primarily from sensory experience and not, as continental rationalists would have it, from
abstract or a priori reasoning. Thus, for empiricists, knowledge could not be gained
absent some level of engagement with concrete facts. To speculate or develop theories
that did not engage such facts was an error at best, and not likely to yield any real
knowledge for any practical use.
Neither philosophy nor the common law was a “self-contained science” in the
eighteenth century; each influenced the development of the other.18 It is for this reason
that traditional forms of common law reasoning, which leveraged judicial precedent as a
tool for argument by analogy, reflected the empirical values of eighteenth-century
Britain. For example, while for continental rationalists knowledge was something to be
acquired through the mind’s recognition of certain pre-existing truths, the British
empiricists urged that knowledge of a given object was only a “perception” of the mind,
based upon the accordance or discordance of that object with other perceptions acquired
by past experience.19 As the writer John Locke put it, for empiricists, the “capacity for
distinguishing one thing from another is the source of the obvious and certain truth of the
proposition.” It was the “mind’s ability to discern or distinguish” and to “to perceive two
ideas to be the same or different” that lead to human understanding.20
The culture of empiricism which had developed in Britain throughout the
eighteenth century, helped to elevate the importance of precedent in judicial decisionmaking in the early 1800s. Prior to that, the common law was defined mostly by its
“sanctity and unchangeability,” as a “fixed body of doctrine based on natural law and
inflexible rules.21 Reference to precedent was an important but not exclusive nor
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obligatory tool used by judges in reaching just solutions. In other words, judges might be
guided by precedent but they were not bound by it, as no official doctrine of stare decisis
existed. 22 By the late eighteenth-century, however, the application of the common law
became increasingly empirical and the ability to apply or distinguish past precedent based
upon the facts of a given case became central to the judicial function. Informed by
empiricism, the common law increasingly accepted the importance of cautious, factcontingent reasoning and incremental change in the law.
By the end of the eighteenth century, reference to the inflexibility and
immemorality of the common law were yielding to discussions of how the common law
“grew.” Indeed, in his survey of the common law during the years 1760 to 1860, the legal
historian Michael Lobban associated the legal culture of the period with the writings of
Edmund Burke, who stressed the importance of slow, half-conscious change in the law. If
the common law did indeed “grow” and develop, Lobban observed, “it was in a Burkean
way, adding on to a sturdy and solid ancient structure” while avoiding the abstract and
the speculative.23 Indeed, the writings of Burke provide helpful insight into the culture of
the eighteenth-century common law, with a particular focus on the ways in which it was
different from that of the First French Republic (1792-1804). As such, they are a
convenient point of reference for an analysis of common law constitutional culture in a
comparative perspective.
Indeed, in recent years, a number of Canadian legal scholars have identified the
writings of Burke with the formative years of a Canadian constitutional culture in the
nineteenth century. For instance, David Schneiderman and Peter H. Russell have urged
that the “moral foundations” of Canadian constitutionalism are imbued with a distinctly
Burkean hue.24 For his part, the historian G. Blaine Baker has suggested that the
influential actors in mid-nineteenth century Upper Canada subscribed to an exaggerated
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form of Burke’s ideology. “By-passed by the American, French, and Industrial
Revolutions,” he wrote, the “legal-administrative elite" of Upper Canada became “radical
in its romantic and stubbornly Georgian posture” and self-concept.25 While it is not
within the limited scope of this analysis to delve further into such claims, it is sufficient
to note that the writings of the Whig parliamentarian are increasingly used by Canadian
scholars as a short hand reference for the early common law culture of the country.
In his writings, Burke argued that the distinctive characteristic of the British
constitution was that it was non-speculative. In his 1790 letter to the French député
Charles Jean François Depont he urged that French rights discourses were abstract and
insufficiently tethered to reality. Affirming his ardour for a “manly, moral, regulated
liberty,”26 he proceeded to rail against the reign of “naked reason” in France,27 which he
held to be “vulgar in the conception [and] perilous in the execution.”28 For him, the
French view of liberty as an object of design by “geometrical distribution and
arithmetical management”29 denied the reality of human nature:
The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest
possible complexity; and therefore no simple disposition or direction of
power can be suitable either to man’s nature or to the quality of his
affairs. When I hear the simplicity of contrivance aimed at and boasted
of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to decide that the
artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade, or totally negligent of their
duty.30
In a similar vein, in his Observations on the Present State of the Nation, penned in 1769,
he wrote that “politics ought to be adjusted, not to human reason, but to human nature of
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which reason is but a part and by no means greatest part.”31 To engage the state in a selfconscious ethical project was by necessity to invite the use of its arbitrary power, for the
complex reality of both the person and his society was simply not amenable to a design
arrived at through discursive reason, even if said design was emancipatory in its
objective.
For Burke, the British constitution was based upon the principle of inherited right
and empirical growth. It was for this reason that he tended to comingle the language of
constitutional “rights” with proprietary “title.” In his letter to Depont, he observed that
the British saw their liberty not as an object of design, but as a “patrimony derived from
their forefathers.”32 It was for “reasons of practical wisdom which superseded their
theoretical science,” he advised, that they favoured a “positive, recorded, hereditary title”
for all that which was worthy of being inherited, to a “vague, speculative right.”33 He
proceeded to reference a series of initiatives from the Magna Carta to the Petition Of
Right (1628), as support for the proposition that it had been the “uniform policy” of the
British constitution to conceptualize liberty as an “entitled inheritance” and an “estate”
belonging to the British people, “without an reference whatever to any other more general
or prior right,” of the kind on which French rights discourses were being conducted.
It is important to observe that the rights to which the British lay claim were
essentially negative rights to be exercised by the individual against the state. Certainly,
the obligation to act affirmatively to facilitate the enjoyment of certain “positive” rights
was not in contemplation in pre-industrial Britain. But what is more important for the
purposes of this analysis, is that conception of rights articulated by Burke did not involve
the state in any kind of formative project aimed at emancipation or the self-conscious
generation of a particular type of society. The state was presumed to be liberty’s natural
antagonist. To look for liberty in the state was to look for it where it could never be
found. The state, Burke argued, is not “made in virtue of natural rights,” for such rights

31

Edmund Burke, “Observations on a Late Publication Entitled The Present State of the
Nation” in Isaac Kramnick, ed, The Portable Edmund Burke (New York: Penguin Books,
1999) at 154.
32
Burke, Reflections at 119.
33
Ibid at 118.
92

existed outside of it.34 The continental philosophy he criticized was be definition
“abstract” because it was oriented to a reality that did not yet exist. The authority of the
state would be a needed to bring about that reality, much to Burke’s consternation.
Finally, it is important to note the essentially empirical way in which Burke
construed constitutional development in Britain. He equated the culture of the British
constitution with the common law, and suggested the importance of adhering to particular
sets of facts in making decisions concerning the rights of the individuals. Echoing the
writings of the empiricists on epistemology, he suggested that it was “circumstances that
“[gave] in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating
effect.”35 It was therefore inadvisable to speculate about rights and their limitations
beyond a concrete set of facts in which a particular decision had to be made. By taking an
essentially empirical approach to the constitution then, it may be said that the constitution
did not “change” per se, but was “meliorated and adapted” to circumstances arising over
time.36 In this way, as the legal historian David Lieberman has suggested, the lateGeorgian British constitution may be best thought of as a “living organism of complex
structure and historical continuity,”37 that had in many ways grown up in
contradistinction to the rationalism of the continent.
iv)

At Common Law, Freedom of Religion Developed as a Negative Right
The development of freedom of religion in Britain was related to other cultural

developments in that country, including trends in law and philosophy. The free exercise
of religion in Britain came about by way of a slow process of religious de-regulation in
the centuries after the Reformation. That process involved a series of legislative
initiatives (often called “relief acts”) which repealed laws burdening particular religious
factions. As this section will suggest, the effect of extending relief to particular religious
sects legitimated their long-standing resistance to a majority with which they refused to
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conform. Emancipation of so-called “non-conforming” Protestants and later Roman
Catholics took the form of a negative right against the state to be unburdened in the
public sphere because of private confessional differences. In this way, freedom of
religion is prototypical of other rights in British constitutional culture. Thus, rights in
Canada can only be adequately understood with reference to the heterodox nature of
religious practice in post-Reformation England.
The Protestant heritage of Britain affected the way in which rights were
conceptualized in two important ways. First, the rise of Protestantism was a critical
influence in the emergence of the “individual” as the principal currency for most
discussions on the human condition in the modern era. As H. Richard Niebuhr has put it,
between the polarities of “order and movement [and] of structure and process,” the
Protestant is arguably oriented to the more dynamic end relative to the Roman Catholic.38
His experience is – again, in the most general of terms – less about being part of an
enduring order and more about internal process.39 The free decision of the individual will
was central. It is in this sense that Marx observed that the effect of the Reformation was
to displace “bondage out of devotion by replacing it with bondage out of conviction.”40
While the distinction is subtle, it is real, and exerted a powerful and still discernable
influence on the development of British constitutional culture.
The second way in which the Reformation affected the development of rights
discourse in Britain was by impressing a distrust of the state on British culture. The
essentially negative nature of “liberty” in the common law tradition can only be
understood in light of the Reformation. Quite apart from the anti-statism of Protestant
“non-conformists,” the Anglican majority were long gripped by fear of the re-emergence
of a Roman Catholic state. Indeed, railings against “arbitrary government’ and “popery,”
ran like a leitmotif throughout most aspects of British culture for over two centuries.
While it may be said that the result was an essentially “negative” conception of liberty as
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the right to be free from the state’s coercive power, there existed a positive aspect to the
constitution as well. That is, in the Anglo-Protestant mind, the freedom of the individual
included his or her right to move toward a goal of action dictated by his or her
conscience.
Until the early nineteenth century, restrictions on matters of conscience were
justified as necessary to protect the inherited rights of Britons, who were axiomatically
assumed to be Protestant. As the Prince Regent put it in 1819,“devine favour and
protection,’ had secured in Britain ‘the principle of religion under a just submission to
lawful authority.41 For centuries after the Reformation, prejudice against Roman
Catholics in Britain was endemic. Adherents of that faith were distrusted as inherently
“un-English” and “fundamentally alien,” associated with continental tyranny.42 It was in
this way that restrictions on religious practice were reconciled with notions of “ancient”
and “inherited” rights. In a manner not atypical of the eighteenth century, “universal”
rights claims were made by and in the interest of a particular and restricted male
demographic. The means by which the British constitution adapted to protect those rights,
and the means by which enjoyment of those rights was extended are worth studying as
indicative of constitutional culture.
v)

The Legal Rules Developed for the Application of the Proportionate Effects
Inquiry Reflect a Common Law Constitutional Culture.
It may be recalled that the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted s. 1 of the

Charter as contemplating a proportionality test as the justificatory standard for all
limitations on constitutional rights. The standard of review that it articulated in its
decision in R. v. Oakes in 1986 closely followed the approach taken by the ECHR in
interpreting the specific limitations clauses of the European Convention on Human
Rights (the “Convention”). Under the so-called “Oakes test,” the Court held, the state has
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to establish on a a balance of probabilities that the legislation under review has been
enacted for a proper purpose and that it meets the three requirements of proportionality:
rational connection, minimal impairment, and proportionality in its effects. With respect
to the final step of the test, it signaled that “the values of a free and democratic society”
would be brought to bear to determine whether the balance between the salutary effects
of the impugned legislation and its deleterious effects on the right is constitutionally
permissible.43
The Supreme Court stated in Oakes that the values of a “free and democratic
society” are both the basis for the rights and freedoms entrenched in the Charter and “the
ultimate standard against which a limitation on a right or freedom must be shown to be
reasonable and demonstrably justifiable.”44 In other words, the Court held that the test
for whether a limit on a right is proportionate and justifiable must be informed by both
the s. 1 reference to a “free and democratic society,” and the normative structure of the
Charter as a whole. While a thorough-going review of the Court’s reflections on that
normative structure is not feasible here, for comparative purposes, two general
observations may be made. First, the court has interpreted s. 1 as being informed by a
“negative rights” ethos guaranteeing non-interference by the state. Secondly, it has
developed legal rules and modes of reasoning for the application of proportionality which
reflect an essentially empirical approach to construing legal rights.
As a preliminary point, however, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has
said that the negative rights ethos informing s. 1 pervades the Charter as a whole. It is
therefore appropriate to refer to the interpretation of other Charter provisions when
construing. s. 1. As the Court held in R. v. Lyons, the “amplification of the content of
each enunciated right or freedom imbues and informs our understanding of the value
structure sought to be protected by the Charter as a whole, and in particular, the content
of the other specific rights and freedoms it embodies.”45 Thus, in the cases of Godbout v
Longueil and R.B. v Children’s Aid Society, the Court began by citing Lyons as the
correct approach to interpreting the content of “liberty” under s. 7. It then proceeded to
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refer specifically to its decisions in Oakes and Big M Drug Mart, dealing with the words
“free” and “freedom” in ss. 1 and 2(a) respectively. 46 All three provisions, it reasoned,
should be interpreted as being informed by the same negative rights ethos.
It may be said that the ethos informing the Charter is one of “negative liberty,”
emphasizing individual or group autonomy and a general right to non-intervention by the
state. It is a philosophical orientation well-explained by Dickson J. (as he then was) in
Big M, in which he pronounced that “freedom can primarily be characterized by the
absence of coercion or restraint,”47 through forms of control that limit “volition” and
autonomous choice.48 He went on to suggest that a society is only “truly free” where it
can “accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity of tastes and pursuits, customs and
codes of conduct.”49 He then characterized the Charter in classically liberal terms as a
safeguard against a “tyranny of the majority.”50 These remarks were subsequently
affirmed in case law on a range of other provisions, including s. 7 where “liberty” was
equated with a right “to make fundamentally personal choices, free from state
interference”51 and s. 2(b), where freedom of expression was interpreted as advancing
“self-fulfillment and autonomy.”52
With respect to freedom of religion under s. 2(a), Dickson J. opined that religious
beliefs were “historically prototypical” of other constitutional guarantees in their focus on
the importance of individual choice and volition. The centrality of conscience and the
free, inward decision of the individual will, Dickson J. suggested, was a cultural
derivative of the English. Reformation. During the English Civil Wars and Interregnum
in particular, he suggested, the idea that “belief was not amenable to compulsion,” gained
ascendency. An essentially English fixation on the “reality of the individual conscience,”
he concluded, further assisted the development of institutional norms of a “free and
democratic society.” He concluded that rigorous protection of individual conscience was
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not only central to s. 2(a), but indicative of the broader “values that underlie [Canadian]
political and philosophical tradition,” and as such, represented the sine qua non of
constitutional rights protection under the Charter.53
To be sure, in Big M Dickson J. noted that negative rights claims against the state,
while essentially individual in nature, can have a collective or group dimension. As
support for this proposition, he interpreted freedom of religion under s. 2(a) by citing s.
27., which prescribes that that document must be interpreted with a view to the
“preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”54 Section 27
has been used as support for the proposition that s. 2(a) of the Charter protects both
individual and group aspects of freedom of religion.55 However, as McLachlin C.J. made
clear in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, the multiculturalism provision
does not transform an individual right against the state into a collective one. Rather, its
effect is often felt at the final stage of the proportionality test. A deleterious effect on the
rights-holder may be considered more serious where it has a broader impact on a group or
community of which he or she is a part.
vi)

In Canada, Justifiable Limitations on Rights are to be Determined Empirically
In light of these normative commitments, it is perhaps unsurprising that the

legitimacy of limitations on rights at the proportionate effects stage of s. 1 justification
has come to focus on the extent to which such limits adversely affect autonomy and
choice. Again, courts have developed legal rules to assist in “quantifying” the salutary
and deleterious effects of the legislation under review from an evaluative standpoint. One
such rule is that the degree of harm which the violation of a right will incur must be
assessed with a view to the values of a free and democratic society; namely, “liberty,
human dignity, equality, autonomy, and the enhancement of democracy”56 The Supreme
Court has stated that, in all cases, “liberty” is “the most fundamental of these values,” and
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it has interpreted the other values in light of it.57 Importantly, it has construed each of
these terms as involving a rigid binary between the rights-holder on the one hand, and the
legislature as representative of the collective interest on the other.
The Supreme Court has used an empiricist and non-speculative approach to
determining whether a limit on a right is proportionate in its effect. A second judiciallydeveloped legal rule is that the gravity of a deleterious effect on a right will depend on
the extent to which it deprives the claimant of his or her freedom of choice. Per Hutterian
Brethren, the question [at the proportionate effects stage] is whether the limit leaves the
adherent with a meaningful choice to follow his or her religious belief or practice.”58 An
effect may range from being “trivial,” in which case it is more likely to be permissible, to
total abrogation of autonomous choice, in which case it is less likely so. At all times
gravity is measured in terms of what the individual is or is not able to do in a given case
or what can clearly be inferred from concrete evidence. Thus, the seriousness of the harm
greatly depends on the engagement of the particular claimant in a particular set of facts.
Conversely, the salutary effects of a limitation on a right will be deemed suspect
where they are unduly speculative or symbolic. There must be some concrete benefit that
is likely to materialize if the rights of an individual or group are to be abridged. Of
course, the salutary effects of legislation are inherently connected to the legislative
objective, and the Court has held that with respect to the proportionate effects inquiry
“the highly symbolic or abstract nature of [an] objective detracts from its importance as a
justification for the violation of a constitutionally protected right.”59 Indeed, as Abella J.
noted in Hutterian Brethren, the proportionate effects inquiry often turns on the question
of whether the benefits gained from a rights-limitation would be “real” or “perceived.”60
Thus, to justify a limitation on a right, the state’s burden is to prove a harm or a real risk
of harm and to demonstrate that the benefits of the limitation are concrete and not
speculative.
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Thus, the legal rules developed for the proportionate effects inquiry are applied to
the factual matrix at hand according to modes of reasoning reflecting a common law legal
culture. The judicial reasoning process used is comparatively inductive and factdependent, leaving little room for the state to legislate in the pursuit of unempirical social
or philosophical objectives. That culture is also one in which liberty tends to be
understood negatively, in terms of the absence of state interference in the enjoyment of
rights. The legal rules of balancing are a matter of judge-made law, and are derived from
judicial interpretation of the constitution’s general limitations clause, s. 1, and their
understanding of the constitutional order as a whole. While they are represented as
flowing naturally from the words “free and democratic,” they in fact reflect local and
particular pre-notions and prejudices of what constitutes a free and democratic society.
vii)

French Constitutional Culture is Based in an Emancipatory Project which
Favours Rationalism
If the culture of the common law is empirical, it may be said that French

constitutional culture is rationalist. That is, it is premised on reasoning that accepts that
there are objective truths pre-existing recognition by the human mind. One such truth is
the natural liberty of the individual. It is a basic postulate of French republicanism that
social institutions must be structured in such a way as to preserve liberty from the
deleterious effects of inequitable social relations. French constitutional culture
accordingly involves the state in a kind of emancipatory project aimed at legislating
conditions deemed necessary for liberty. To a certain extent, French republicanism
contemplates freedom through the state as opposed to freedom from the state.61 Liberty
may exist in a state of nature, but it is not a natural or historic given; rather it must be
secured by the republic.62 This requires the state to be able to legislative prescriptively,
and to exert a rationalizing, emancipatory influence on a broadly-construed public sphere.
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A critical part of the state’s role, then, is to impose its “social authority” in the
interest of “promoting the autonomy of persons.”63 The revolutionary heritage of the
French Republic is discernable in the presumption that the state should have a role in
“culturing” society to modernity. As this section will reveal, perhaps the most important
aspect of that acculturation is the republic’s function in wrenching the individual out of
his archaic, sectarian identities and engaging him in a shared project of being free. In
comparative perspective, it may be noticed that French republicans are confident in the
universality of their values, and in the corrosive effect of illiberal, sectarian traditions on
democratic life.64 As a result, the distinction between the liberty of the individual and the
interests of the collective is not as clear as in other constitutional traditions. The
remainder of this chapter will explain how the incorporation of judicial review has taken
account of this difference.
In order to account for the comparative inseverability of individual interests from
public ones in French constitutional culture, it is necessary to examine certain precepts of
French republicanism. This requires a degree of engagement with an extensive body of
philosophical, literary, and aesthetic representations of the republican ideal as it has
developed in France since the late-eighteenth century. Indeed, the French revolutionary
period initiated both a tradition of ephemeral constitutional instruments and of republican
expression in a range of intellectual and cultural mediums. It is for this reason that, as the
French cultural historian Pierre Nora put it, “republicanism” in France has long been
characterized by “a powerful political culture” and an “empty political form.” In other
words, Nora added, it has long had “strong emotional [but] weak institutional
substance.”65 French republican thought, while itself a multiform and complex tradition,
continued to be the real source of norms of constitutional value in France. The
“legicentic” nature of French constitutional culture can only be explained with reference
to certain peculiar features of that discursive tradition.
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viii)

The Writings of Rousseau Exerted a Formative Influence on French
Republicanism

The inclination to conceive of individual rights as involving a strong collective
dimension is derived from a distrust of “factional” interests which extends at least as far
back as the mid-eighteenth century. While a distinct culture of republicanism would not
emerge in France until at least as early as the First Republic (1792-1804), the deeply antisectarian nature of French republican discourse is traceable to the writings of Rousseau.
He introduced to early French republicanism at once a Romantic preoccupation with
“nature” and an attachment to the cultural norms of classical antiquity. He proposed that
in an (allegorical) “state of nature,” man had been noble and free, but had been corrupted
in society by his “amour propre,” or his impulse to covet the esteem of others.66
Rousseau repined, “[d]ependence on men engenders all the vices, and by it, master and
slave are mutually corrupted.”67 If man were to retain his freedom in society, he wrote, he
required a sort of healing education.
He prescribed a neo-classical conception of the “citizen” not merely as a bearer of
legal privileges and immunities, but as an active participant in the sovereign authority. To
remain free, the individual had to engage in public-decision making. Further, he had to
engage in such a way as to produce laws which would not define his society by relations
of inequity. He did so by subordinating his private or “particular interests,” and orienting
himself to the “general will.”68 Again, for Rousseau, the “general will” was not the
additive total of a majority of private wills. Rather, it was the “highest common factor of
agreement,”69 or the “rational” interest in general terms of the society as an organic
whole. In order to participate in self-government and in the shaping of the “general will,”
he advised, the individual needed to be cultured in an ethic of “civic virtue,” as inspired
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by the stoic, austere and egalitarian habits he attributed to the city-state cultures of Greek
and Roman antiquity.
To be sure, Rousseau recognized that by entering into this “civil state,” the
individual relinquished some of the freedom he enjoyed in a “state of nature.” He could
no longer pursue his private interests without regard for the general will. However,
Rousseau proposed that passage into a civil state would produce a “remarkable change"
in man. By “substituting justice for instinct in his conduct,” the actions of the citizen
acquired a “moral” quality they had formerly lacked:
Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses
and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself,
find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his
reason before listening to his inclinations.
By entering the social contract, he concluded, man’s faculties would be “so stimulated
and developed” and his feelings “so ennobled” that he would “bless continually the
happy moment” that it delivered him from being “a stupid and unimaginative animal”
and made of him “an intelligent being and a man.”70
Rousseau’s prescription of a high-level of engagement in public decision-making
complimented by an egalitarian culture of “civic virtue” deeply influenced French
republican culture in its formative stages. A “literary cult of Rousseau” which had
prevailed in intellectual circles during the final years of the Bourbon monarchy, gradually
transformed during the First Republic into a “political cult of Rousseau.”71 Veneration of
his writings not only reinforced the period’s neo-classical preoccupations in literature and
the arts, but found powerful expression in revolutionary festivals, hymns, iconography,
and even modes of dress. During the dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety
(1793-94) in particular,72 the extolling of “virture and regeneration of morals” pervaded
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most aspects of public life, as the revolution extended its ambitions to a reformation of
human nature.73 The revolutionary heritage of France was profoundly influenced by
Rousseau’s association of liberty with virtue, and it is from that heritage that French
republican culture derived much of its emotional energies.
The origins of French secularism or laïcité can be traced to the First Republic and,
in some measure, to the intellectual contributions of Rousseau.74 Born in the Republic of
Geneva, Rousseau was of Calvinist extraction, but identified in his writings as a deist
who perceived divinity in nature.75 He distinguished between “inward devotion to the
supreme God,” and sectarian religion, or what he referred to as “the religion of the
priest.”76 The latter, he wrote, had produced in France “a kind of mixed and anti-social
system of law,” by dividing society and inculcating intolerance. He urged that sectarian
religion was antithetical to the social contract, for it “detached” men from civic life and
the general welfare, “as from all earthy things.” It indulged man’s impulse to amour
propre by enticing him to turn inward, and to perceive his fellow citizens as “others” with
interests antagonistic to his own. He accordingly equated “religion and civil intolerance. 77

ix)

Religious Sectarianism Contributed to the Development of Rousseau’s Notion
of the “General Will”
The importance of his writings can only be understood in light of the role of the

Roman Catholic Church in mid-eighteenth century France. The late-Bourbon monarchy
was a régime of an ineradicably Catholic character. The church legitimated the régime by
inculcating belief in the divine right of kings and teaching the necessity of sacerdotal
power and mediatory access to grace and Christian salvation. As the cultural historian
Adam Zamoyski has put it, Roman Catholicism was no less than the “central organizing
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principle” of French politics, education, art and even language.78 The church sanctified
the French monarchy, and was in turn privileged by it. As the so-called “first estate” of
the realm, its clergy were subject to a range of political privileges and immunities. The
church coveted such advantages while resisting efforts to extend toleration to French
Protestants and Jews. It also retained a right to petition the state to censor offensive or
sacrilegious material, which it successfully exercised to induce publication bans on the
Social Contract and Émile.79
It was for these reasons that Rousseau’s anti-sectarianism and his emphasis on the
general will was influential for a range of actors in the First Republic. To be sure, it is not
possible here to comprehensively review state policies toward religion during the First
Republic. The difficulties which inhere in such an undertaking is due to the fact that the
First Republic remained an ill-defined concept. It was neither officially inaugurated nor
abolished,80 and never represented a coherent system of government. It was, rather, a
process of historical development involving at least three distinct republican régimes: a
parliamentary dictatorship under the National Convention (1792-95), a limited suffrage
republic known as the Directory (1795-99), and the plebiscitary régime termed the
Convention (1799-1804).81 During that period, treatment of religion in the public sphere
was in a state of constant change, responsive to both the ideological aspirations of private
decision-makers and the political realities to which they felt obliged to respond.
It is important to begin, however, by noting the role of the Roman Catholic
Church in precipitating the emergence of republicanism as a viable system of government
in the years leading up to 1791. As late as 1789, when most of its members presumed the
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continued viability of the Bourbon monarchy, the National Assembly initiated a farreaching process of constitutional re-structuring. With respect to the church, it pursued a
“dual policy” of extending legal rights to non-Catholics,82 while subordinating the Roman
Catholic Church to the authority of the state through such measures as the abolition of
ecclesiastical taxing power and the confiscation of church lands. Most importantly,
however, in 1790 the French government adopted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy,
which divested clerics of their legal privileges and required them to take an oath of
fidelity to the new constitution. When both the French monarchy and the Papacy resisted
the Civil Constitution, the collapse of the ancien régime was accelerated and anti-clerical
sentiment was intensified.
The first two republican régimes to follow the abolition of the monarchy in 1792
contributed significantly to the French republican distrust of “factional interests,”
particularly religious ones. The papacy’s repudiation of the Civil Constitution of the
Clergy intensified republican hostility to the church, and initiated a divide between socalled “juring” priests who took the oath and “non-juring” or “refractory” priests who
refused. Thereafter, the National Convention and Directory governments were engaged in
sustained but unsuccessful efforts to stabilize the country, which found itself menaced by
foreign armies from without, and by Catholic and royal reactionaries from within. The
most sanguinary example of such reaction was the war in the Vendée region between the
republic and an insurgency called the Catholic and Royal Army.83 Taking at least one
hundred and seventy thousand lives, the Vendée war epitomized what François Furet has
termed “the depth of the conflict between religious tradition and the revolutionary
foundations of democracy” in France.84
Indeed, it was largely the religious instability of the First Republic which lead to
the conferral of dictatorial power to the so-called Committee for Public Safety under
Robespierre in 1793. During that period, the Committee advanced ever more radical
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policies aimed at “de-Christianisation” or the total extirpation of the Catholic religion
from France. This involved both efforts to develop new forms of civil religion, and to
discourage “superstitious and hypocritical faiths.”85 The Committee introduced severe
restrictions on public worship and on the public display of religious iconography, and
enacted laws prohibiting ecclesiastics from wearing religious garb in public places.86
Incited by the executive government of the country, Jacobin clubs took up the task of
destroying “crucifixes, virgins, images of saints” and other “ridiculous” objects that could
be construed as vestiges of “royalism, feudalism, and superstition.”87 The period
reinforced in France a cultural association between religious expression and a lack of
concern for the general welfare.
Finally, it is important to note that the Committee supplemented restrictions on
religious expression with affirmative measures aimed at the regeneration of French
society in light of a pre-Christian ideal. This included the repeal of the Gregorian
calendar for its historical association with the papacy, and the establishment of statesanctioned forms of deistic worship, complete with rituals such as “civic baptism” and
ceremonial garb reminiscent of the Roman Republic.88 Robespierre in particular exerted
himself in developing “a religion of the republic and a national morality,” deeply imbued
with ideas derived from Rousseau. For instance, prayers of the period implored the
“Supreme Being” to, among other things, “restore man to his primitive perfection.”89
Atheism was discouraged and poorly subscribed. The real tension from which the First
Republic was never able to deliver itself was rather between traditional modes of Roman
Catholic belief and a contrived form of deism which was austere, anti-sectarian and
oriented to the general welfare.
From its formative stages, French republican culture distrusted attachment to
“factional interests” as inimical to the egalitarian ideal. Forged in resistance to feudal
structures sustained by social privilege and private advantage, the “people” were exalted
by republicans as a basically unitary, fraternal civic body in which minorities were not
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recognized.90 The interests of the First Republic did much to shape a view of the “people”
as perpetually menaced by what Pierre Lévy has called the emergence of “other
legitimacies.”91 The emancipation of French Jews in 1791 was a paradigmatic example of
the way in which republican equality applied. In the words of the député ClermontTonnere, Jews were to be “refused everything qua nation, and granted everything qua
individuals.” They would not be a “political body or order within the state” but would
“acquire citizenship individually.”92 The only way to secure liberty was though an
assertion of the equality of citizens by abolishing a litany of “mass anomalies” and
entrenched privileges associated with feudal hierarchy.93
A related aspect of this anti-sectarianism was the broad construal that the First
Republic gave to the public sphere relative to the private. This is particularly evident in
the emphasis that it placed on civic virtue and on engagement in civic institutions. As
Marx observed, the political project initiated by the First Republic exalted the individual
as a discrete being, but always into a sort of general but abstract communal existence.94
This was in many ways due to the intellectual influence of Rousseau, who stressed the
importance of civic commitment over self-interest. While the nature of public
engagement and of in civic institutions has varied greatly, a comparatively rigid
distinction the between the private and public sphere has remained. In short, in French
republicanism, the ideals of liberty and equality have never been thought of distinct of a
fraternal “community of citizens,” bound together by an ethical project and a shared civic
loyalty.
The religious tensions of the First Republic would only subside after Bonaparte’s
accession to power and his implementation of a Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. But
the period preceding the Concordat had given rise to a distinctive republican culture, that
would continue to develop and mature throughout the nineteenth-century. Importantly, it
remained ill-at-ease with factional identities and attached to the notion that strong civic
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institutions might transcend private differences. Again, the French republic has always
been predicated on the notion that the right to be left undisturbed by the state is not
sufficient to secure liberty and self-government. Rather, it sees public life as involving an
emancipatory project which obliges the citizen to be free in a particular way. This was the
enduring legacy of the First Republic, when only a unitary, fraternal civic bond was
thought to be sufficiently strong to break the hold of feudal inequity. That legacy was
leveraged in the early years of the Third Republic (1870-1940) to form the basis of laïcité
as coherent doctrine of secularism with a basis in law.
x)

Laïcité Began to be Incorporated as an Official Doctrine of the French
Republic in the Late-Nineteenth Century
The contemporary état laïque was introduced in France beginning the early 1870s

in response to new incursions of the Roman Catholic Church in French public life. In
1864, the Vatican released a document called The Syllabus of Errors, which condemned
substantially the entire panoply of Enlightenment political ideas, including liberty,
separation of church and state, and the presumption of equality with other Christian
faiths, or what it called “indifferentialism.”95According to the historian Robert Gildea, the
Syllabus was so far-reaching as to effectively preclude reconciliation between the church
and liberal or democratic ideas in France.96 The church also condemned the Paris
Commune of 1871, which had revived persecution of clerics, as the culmination of an
anti-religious revival that had beset France with instability since 1789.97 Finally, they
argued that the country’s defeat by a Protestant state in the Franco-Prussian War (18701871) had been God’s punishment for the sins of the Enlightenment and the French
Revolution.98
The church accordingly pursued a program of “Moral Order,” putatively aimed at
expiation of the country’s sins. French church officials argued for the restoration of both
the monarchy and the Pope’s temporal power, which had been ceded as a result of the
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Concordat. Its most successful initiative, however, was its effort to extend the church’s
grip on national education, as a means of inculcating Catholic thought and prejudice at
both the primary and secondary school levels.99 The church’s control of girls’ education
by nuns reached its highest point in 1878, when the number of those in female
congregations, which had been 66,000 in 1850, more than doubled to 135,000.100 The
church also successfully agitated for legislation allowing for Catholic universities for the
first time since the revolution, ending a state monopoly on education at the secondary and
post-secondary levels established by Bonaparte so that all future military and civil
officers would have to pass through the same education system.
The French government responded by legislating for free education in 1881 and
for compulsory secular or lay education the following year. It justified a prohibition on
religious schools by insisting that the republican doctrine of laïcité required the state
school to be a neutral space in which liberty of conscience prevailed. Delivering
education through the filter of religious doctrine was deemed to be antithetical to that
objective.101 In the place of Christian morality a civic or “independent” morality was to
be taught, based on such secular notions as fraternity and solidarity.102 The new moral
instruction was to be supplemented with civic education aimed at training the future
citizen in democratic participation and self-government. The introduction of a secular
education system was roundly justified with reference to republican principles and the
Revolution of 1789.103 As in the First Republic, the imposition of a neutral public sphere
was an assertion of power; and an attempt to sustain an egalitarian and fraternal
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democracy, in which every citizen felt a sense of obligation for the liberty of his fellow
citizen.
The most important legislative initiative taken during the was the 1905 law on the
Separation of Church and State. That law finally abolished the 1802 Concordat and
remains the de jure basis of laïcité in France. Iterating Art. 10 of the 1789 Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen (the “DDHC”) Art. 1 of the 1905 law guaranteed the “free
exercise of faiths under no other restrictions than those set out in the interests of public
order.” In Article 2 it was declared that “the republic does not recognize, remunerate or
subsidize any faith.” Art. 28 prohibits any display of religious symbols or iconography in
any public place, excepting religious edifices, cemeteries, museums or exhibitions. The
1905 law has been supplemented by a number of ministerial “circulars” including a 1936
ban on the wearing of religious insignia, a 1937 ban on religious proselytising in schools,
and an affirmation in 1944 of school neutrality.104
In the Fifth Republic, the 1905 law of separation is recognized as a constitutional
law by virtue of having been recognized by the Constitutional Council as reflecting
principles which are fundamental to republican France. The council’s authority to so
designate a law stems from the preamble of the 1946 constitution, which affirms the
constitutionality of a range of unspecified “fundamental principles recognized by the
laws of the Republic.”105 Accordingly, the principle of laïcité is a norm with which all
sub-constitutional laws must conform. French constitutional law guarantees at once a
wide range of individual rights, and a constitutional structure that is prima facie ill-suited
to recognizing religious distinctions in the public sphere.106 The remainder of this thesis
will explain how an equilibrium between the two is reached from the standpoint of legal
doctrine. It will be argued that the degree of protection afforded to religious rights has
less to do with the doctrine of laïcité per se than with France’s legicentric constitutional
culture.
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xi)

French “Légiscentisme” Presumes a Role for Civic Virtue and Laïcité
As a matter of constitutional law, the legality of the ban on the public wearing of

full-face veils was based not on laïcité per se but on the level of deference afforded to the
legislature by the Constitutional Council. The requirement of proportionate effects and
the legal rules affecting their operation were determined with a view to legislative
competence. But the doctrine of laïcité does inform how that competence is construed,
and it is important to understand the way in which it does. For non-French observers
trying to understand the role of laïcité in determining deference in French constitutional
rights adjudication, it helps to begin by remembering that, historically, legislative
supremacy was the norm in France and that the judge was accordingly assigned an
essentially passive role. There is, however, an important third element which has long
supplemented what would otherwise be a system of parliamentary majoritarianism. That
third element is foreign to common law conceptions of constitutional rights protection but
integral to those of the French Republic.
At a theoretical level, majority rule in France has always been tempered (or even
directed) by an ethic of civic virtue, and laïcité is merely an example of that ethic
transcribed into law. The link between laïcité and republicanism was well-stated by the
historian Claude Nicolet, who observed that “[l]egal and territorial integrity also require
unity of another kind: moral or spiritual: this is the function of laïcité.”107 In terms of the
legislative function, this strong civic culture lends itself to the notion that the legislature
not only has a right but a duty to pursue objectives for the public interest. What makes
this conception of legislative competence different from other parliamentary democracies
is the relatively broad construal that is given to the public interest. The doctrine of laïcité
provides a good example of how that public interest is circumscribed as the content of
legislative competence. In France, the public and private interests are clearly
distinguished.
In practice, the notion of civic virtue and laïcité gave rise to a comparatively rigid
dichotomy between public and private spheres, and a far-reaching construal of the former
107
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relative to the latter.108 In the private sphere, the individual incarnates. “natural and
imprescriptible rights,” including to religious liberty.109 In the public sphere, she is called
to be a “citoyenne,” engaged in “public reasoning,”110 as part of a formative,
emancipatory project of democratic and egalitarian citizenship. Historically, laïcité
developed as a tool for ensuring a neutral and non-sectarian public sphere. That civic
space was and is thought by French republicans to be necessary in order to shore-up the
fraternal, associative bond at the “heart of the republican pact.’111 With the incorporation
of judicial review, French jurists have had to develop proportionality standards that in
their application were able to account for this pub-priv. divide, so as not to unduly restrict
the ability of the legislature to make law for the public sphere.
xii)

In France, Balancing Reflects a Legicentric Legal Culture
It is important to recall that none of France’s four operative constitutional rights

instruments contain a general limitations clause. The Constitutional Council infers the
standard of review for limitations on constitutional rights from the text of the rights
implicated in a given case. Accordingly, the standard is more or less rigorous depending
on the constitutional principles engaged. While the way in which the standard is
formulated varies from case to case, the objective of the Constitutional Council is always
to ensure an “equilibrium” between conflicting values.112 Depending on the rights
engaged, that may involve review for a “manifest error of appreciation,” a standard not
unlike review for an insufficiently important objective in other jurisdictions. The council
may add to that review for a rational connection and minimal impairment. Finally, it may
apply a full proportionality test by adding an evaluation of the “possible consequences”113
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of the legislation under review. Again, review for “possible consequences” is
substantially similar to the proportionate effects test.
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in Art. 10 of the DDHC which states that “no
one shall be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the
manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the public order, as determined by
law.” Again, because French rights adjudication focuses on abstract principles rather than
discrete textual provisions, where an infringement of Art. 10 is under review, it usually is
in conjunction with other articles relating to Art 10, such as Arts. 4 and 5. Those broad
“liberty” rights provide that the “natural rights of man [have] no boundaries other than
those to ensure to other members of society the same rights,” and that limits on rights are
permissible where their exercise “harms others” or is “injurious to society.”114 It should
be noted that each article speaks both to the right and to its justifiable limits.
In the particular case of Loi n° 2010-1192 respecting concealment of the face in
public, the standard of review was inferred by the council from the limiting language of
Arts. 4, 5, and 10 of the DDHC and Art. 3 of the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution.
According to the text of those provisions, the legislature has the right to limit individual
freedoms in matters of religion where the exercise of those rights would be injurious to
other rights-holders and to the public order. Art 3 of the 1946 preamble lends legitimacy
to state initiatives aimed at advancing gender equality. These articles are substantively
similar to what is found in rights instruments in other democratic jurisdictions. As this
section will make clear, the formulation and application of a proportionality test to Loi n°
2010-1192 turned largely on unarticulated normative considerations, which speak to the
legicentric nature of French constitutional culture rather than the doctrine of laïcité per
se.
In Dec. 2007-555 DC respecting concealment of the face in public, no possible
consequences test was applied. Again, taken together, the provisions cited in that case
(Arts. 4, 5, and 10 of the DDHC), suggests a broad liberty right to autonomy and
individual choice that can only be abridge by the legislature where its exercise is
injurious to other rights-holders. By virtue of Art 3 of the preamble of the Constitution of
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1946, it is clear that harm of a gendered-nature may justify such limitations. In Dec.
2007-555 DC, the Constitutional Council inferred from these articles a manifest error
test plus a means-end review, suggesting a robust role for the legislature in determining
the role of religion in the public sphere. As suggested in the previous section, in
constitutional rights adjudication, the interest of the “public sphere” are usually expressed
as social or collective interests, juxtaposed against individual interests during the
balancing stage of proportionality.
It is critical to note, however, that where an inquiry into the “possible
consequences” of a law is applied, it is done using legal rules that reflect the “legicentric”
culture of French constitutionalism.115 As explained in the previous two chapters,
proportionality was incorporated gradually into French law, and has been adapted to that
end. This includes the judicially-developed legal rules of the test’s application, which in
France have been formulated to reflect an historical commitment to the supremacy of
statutory law. This does not mean that the interest of individual rights-holders are given
sub-standard consideration. Rather, the concept of “légiscentrisme.” stands for the
proposition that while individual rights are affirmed in the French constitution, it is in a
context that recognizes a strong collective dimension to rights enjoyment. In France, the
lack of a clear distinction between individual rights and the public interest is particularly
evident at the proportionate effects stage of proportionality, because of the evaluative
nature of that requirement.
In Dec. 2007-555 DC, for instance, the Constitutional Council upheld legislation
granting a tax credit for the acquisition of a primary residence as a justifiable limit on the
principle of equality before public burdens.116 It applied a possible consequences or
proportionate effects test. In doing so, it used legal rules indicating not judicial deference
as it is understood in common law systems, but a judicial recognition that individual
rights and the public interest do not exist in a sharp dichotomy. It noted the possible
effects of the legislation, and evaluated those effects with reference to the requirements of
a means and ends review. Specifically, it noted that the effects of the law were acceptable
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in that they advanced “a purpose of general interest,” and then noted that the effects
reflected “objective and rational standards with respect to the goal sought by the
legislature.” Finally, it held that the law was not “a manifestly disproportionate tax
benefit in light of its objective.” Reference to deleterious effects on affected persons was
implicit, but the balancing exercise was structured around the competence of the
legislature.
The way in which the Constitutional Council relates balancing back to the
objective and means chosen by the legislature is indicative of a culture of légicentrisme,
as is its disinclination to engage in balancing at all in most cases. When the council
declines to engage in the formulation of policy, or to exercise “a general power of
appreciation” akin to that of the legislature, it is not showing judicial “deference” as that
concept is understood in common law jurisdictions. In common law jurisdictions it is
assumed that courts exist to protect individuals from other branches of government,
implying limits on legislative authority where individual rights are implicated. This
conception presupposes that rights and the public interest can be clearly distinguished. It
also presumes a sort of binary relationship where courts represent the interests of
individual rights-holders and legislatures represent societal interests. This conception has
historically not pertained in France. As a consequence, if the presumption of a dichotomy
between the rights-holder and the public interest is beginning to set in, it remains far less
rigid than in other jurisdictions.
xiii)

Conclusion

In this chapter, it was suggested that, from a comparative standpoint, the
proportionate effects or balancing stage of proportionality is the most important. This is
because the proportionate effects stage of proportionality is evaluative rather than
empirical, and as such, is able to give expression to value-laden considerations which are
related to the constitutional culture of a given jurisdiction. The proportionate effects test
is shaped by constitutional culture both in the conscious efforts of judges to interpret the
meaning of the text of a constitution’s limitations provision, and the modes of legal
reasoning that they bring to bear, often un-consciously, in applying that test. This chapter
has leveraged the intellectual and culture history of the comparator jurisdictions to
116

explain interpretive patterns that are relevant to a comparative analysis of the
proportionate effects test. In so doing, this chapter identified significant but often subtle
or facially imperceptible differences in the constitutional cultures of the comparator
states.
The aspects of both constitutional cultures which were relevant to this chapter are
those relating to the effect that the role of the legislature has on legal reasoning at its most
basic level. In this narrow respect, it was suggested that Canada’s constitutional culture
reflects the empiricism of the common law while France’s constitutional culture is
imbued with the rationalism of the French Enlightenment. As a result, in the words of
J.A. Talmon, the former is distinguished by a preference for “organic, slow, half-growth”
while the latter embodies “doctrinaire deliberateness.”117 These cultural differences are
responsible for divergent conceptions of the relationship of the individual rights-holder to
the interests of the society of which he or she is a part. While Canadian constitutional
culture conceives of a rigid binary between the individual and the collective as
represented by the state’s legislative power, French constitutional culture is far more
legicentric in the sense that the distinction between the freedom of the individual and the
freedom of his society is less clear.
Thus, in the case of restrictions on religious expression in the public sphere,
divergent outcomes are due mainly to different cultural assumptions about the legitimate
role of the legislature and less about different doctrines of secularism per se. Canadian
secularism and French laïcité are substantively different doctrines; one is a theory of
negative liberty based on the free exercise of religion, the other prescribes a neutral
public sphere to ensure the full participation of individuals as “citizens” of a selfgoverning republic. While in Canada secularism refers to a culture of negative liberty, in
France it is a substantive doctrine that supports a legislature which was historically
unfettered but for the influence of a culture of civic virtue intended to direct the
behaviour of free people. Judicial review on a proportionality standard has been very
recently grafted onto long-standing patterns in both countries. As this chapter has
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revealed, it has been modified out of necessity to comport with entrenched constitutional
cultures.
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Chater 5: Conclusion
This thesis sought to shed light on the limits of proportionality’s potential as a
vector for driving global convergence in rights norms. It was held that the migration of
that legal standard across jurisdictions has yielded a high level of synchronization in the
methodology of rights adjudication, but not a “universal” standard or an “ultimate rule of
law.”1 It was argued that as a supra-national legal standard, proportionality is shaped in
its operation by established modes of legal reasoning in the jurisdiction in which it is
applied. To illustrate this point, the application of proportionality to particular legislative
limitations on freedom of religion in Canada and the French Republic were analysed
from a comparative standpoint. It was shown that divergences in the way in which that
test operates are the result of different, historically-contingent interpretive perspectives.
As a result, the culture of the constitution into which proportionality is incorporated is
both discernable in the operation of that legal standard and determinative of its outcomes.
The focus of this comparative analysis was on particular statutory restrictions on
freedom of religion. Specifically, Canadian and French case law was analysed in order to
shed light on each jurisdiction’s approach to constitutional review of statutory bans on
public veiling. This analysis accordingly concentrated on the French Constitutional
Council’s decision upholding the constitutionality of that country’s ban on concealment
of the face in public and related decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Both
jurisdictions conduct review of such rights-limitations with a standard of review based
upon the requirements of proportionality as developed in the law of the European Court
of Justice (the “ECJ”) and the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECHR”). That
standard is, however, modified by the constitutional culture in which it is applied.
In order to explain the ways in which constitutional culture affects the operation
of proportionality, this thesis used a contextualist methodology based upon the precepts
of legal historicism. Intellectual and cultural history was leveraged to account for
differences in the way in which proportionality is applied. Specifically, historical
discourses surrounding relevant aspects of legal reasoning in each of the comparator
states were analysed to show how the way in which rights are balanced is influenced by
1
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interpretive perspectives and “shared meanings” that are very much organic in the sense
that they are historically-developed and socially-transmitted.2 Accordingly, the
methodology of this thesis was not adopted to advance reform of the law, but with a view
to enhancing understanding of the operation of superficially-similar legal standards
across jurisdictions with a particular emphasis on the effect of constitutional culture.
The first chapter of this thesis set the groundwork for a comparative analysis of
legal doctrine by explaining why the application of proportionality looks different in each
jurisdiction. It was noted that proportionality is a sort of “hybrid” test which involves
both fact-dependent inductive reasoning, and deduction from general principles. As such,
it can be incorporated with relative ease into both common law and civil law systems. But
each system tends to stress facts or principles in applying proportionality in order to
better comport with established practices of legal reasoning. The result is a difference in
the way in which the test is articulated rather than a difference in requirements which are
brought to bear, given that in either case, both facts and principles are inevitably engaged.
Thus, in Canada, proportionality was shown in its operation to be fact-sensitive and
discursive, while in France it is terse and syllogistic. It was argued that the extent to
which each legal system acknowledges engagement with the factual matrix of a case can
be explained by the historical development of discourses surrounding the notion of
legislative supremacy in each country.
In the second chapter, a full comparative analysis of the application of
proportionality was undertaken, focusing on the French Constitutional Council’s decision
respecting concealment of the face in public and related case law of the Supreme Court of
Canada. It was shown that, in assessing such legislation for constitutionality, both legal
systems make a preliminary inquiry into whether the law has a proper purpose, followed
by a review for a rational connection between legislative means and ends, and for
minimal impairment of the constitutional right. In Canada, constitutional review of
alleged violations of freedom of religion, like reviews of other constitutionally protected
rights, requires a balancing inquiry or requirement of “proportionate effects.” In France,
2
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the nature of the balancing of “possible consequences” is heavily dependent upon the
particular rights engaged. Generally, however, French balancing is more oriented to the
legislature than Canadian balancing.
The second chapter also suggested that when accounting for different results in
the application of proportionality in Canada and the French Republic, the balancing test
tends to be decisive. While the proper purpose, rational connection, and minimal
impairment requirements are essentially empirical questions, the proportionate effects test
is evaluative. That is, it is concerned with value judgments about what is good or
acceptable in a democratic society. Accordingly, it tends to be the main venue for the
expression of the cultural dimension of rights in a given jurisdiction. While Canadian
balancing tends to give expression to a cultural notion of rights as concentrated in the
individual, French balancing reflects an historical preoccupation with being free in a
collective capacity. If balancing is undertaken at all, it is done so as not to represent
individual and collective interests as being strictly divided and opposed.
The third chapter of this thesis was a concentrated analysis of the proportionate
effects or balancing stage as a site for the expression of constitutional culture. It was
noted that courts develop legal rules for the balancing inquiry that reflect their
understanding of the normative standard against which limitations on rights must be
justified based on the language of the limitations provisions of the constitution. It was
proposed that in Canada the rules of balancing reflect a presumption that individual rights
and the collective interests exist in a relatively strict dichotomy. For instance, the state is
restricted in its ability to pursue abstract or symbolic initiatives, and the gravity of a
limitation on a right tends to be measured with reference to individual autonomy. In
France, individual and collective rights do not exist in as rigid a dichotomy. During
balancing, harmful effects on individual rights are related back to the state’s ends and
means, and assessed in light of state’s right to legislate in the public interest.
It was also suggested that this way of conceptualizing rights derives from very
basic tendencies in legal reasoning. In Canada, constitutional review tends to be
conducted empirically, focusing narrowly and non-speculatively on the concrete interests
of a claimant. This is not a universal practice, but reflects the integration of rights
adjudication into a common law culture. In the French Republic, the legal rules of
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balancing relate individual rights back to the legislature, and the proper balance between
the rights of the individual and the public interest are arrived in a rather more abstract
way. That high degree of abstraction is a direct result of the relative lack of a clear
distinction between the individual and the public interest historically. The French
republican tradition confers on the legislature the right to make law prescriptively, with a
view to securing the societal conditions necessary for individual liberty. Accordingly, the
outcome of judicial review of statutory restrictions on religious expression in the public
sphere does not turn on notions of secularism per se, but on divergent conceptions of
legislative competence which find expression in the proportionate effects stage of
proportionality.
As detailed in the third chapter, the influence of religion in society should not be
thought of so much as an insular subject of inquiry within the law, but as a critical
determinant in the growth of the law, shaping both the empiricism of the common law
and the rationalism of French civil law. In relative terms, the history of the Protestant
Reformation in England yielded a more dichotomous view of the individual’s
relationship to the state, while France’s more homogenous religious make-up gave rise to
a self-concept with a far more defiant collective dimension. French republicanism cannot
be understood without reference to that country’s conflictual relationship to the Roman
Catholic Church. By the late-eighteenth century, France’s unique history had yielded a
conviction among influential actors that only a unitary, fraternal civic bond could be
sufficiently strong to break the hold of feudal and religious inequity. It is for this reason
that it may be said that liberty is not regarded by French republicans as a natural or
historic given, but as a state of being that must be secured by the republic in its legislative
capacity.
By analysing law as embedded within a particular, organic historical context, a
richer and more fulsome understanding of the law’s role in regulating contemporary
human conduct can be achieved. Legal standards such as proportionality, which are
substantially similar as a matter of positive law, are modified in their application by their
interaction with entrenched norms and modes of reasoning. Accordingly, the extent to
which proportionality is adapted should not be overshadowed by the apparent success of
its migration. It is important not to allow a preoccupation with what are increasingly
122

presumed to be universal standards in rights protection to distract from the continued
relevance of local, culturally-contingent norms and practices. To do so would both inhibit
effective discourse in law and impair the development of self-knowledge, both of which
are arguably the most important ends of comparative constitutional scholarship. This
thesis has sought to re-situate rights adjudication within culture and to affect an
expansion of the terms in which it is evaluated, understood and critiqued.
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